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BENCH -MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
New ·York -city Transit Authority v. Beazer, No. 77-1427
November 28, 1978
This case presents the question whether the Transit

Authority violates the equal protection clause when it refuses to
employ in any capacity persons who have been on methadone
maintenance for a year or more.

The district court also found

that this policy violates Title VII because of its
disproportionate impact on blacks and Puerto Ricans.

The Second

Circuit did not address this second issue, however, and it
probably would be best not to reach it here.

l'

t

.

•.

~

As, it seems, in every case I am working on this month,
there is a suggestion that the grant of certiorari was
improvident.

--

Respondent argues that recent amendments to federal

legislation involving discrimination against the handicapped will

~--------~----------~--------~-We do not know whether President Carter has

govern this case.

signed these admendments into law, although I hope to run this
/ down before argument.

Under these amendments, employers will be

\ forbidden from discriminating against former addicts.

These

amendments might deal with the underlying issue in this case,
although there is at least some question about that
.

----

(e~g~,

Can

this legislation be applied to municipalities in light of
National Leaque ·of · cities?
"former addict"?).

~ ~

fotJL
~

In any event, the scope of relief against the

city will be substantially different if the lower court's ruling
is allowed to stand:

every drug addict ever denied employment by

the Transit Authority will have a potential § 1983 suit against
the TA under the present ruling, while the federal amendments

~ will
~ v{;'

Is a present methadone addict a

be

~respective

only.

Finally, the decision of the court

below strikes me as bad precedent that should be reversed.

For

~ ~ these reasons, I think this Court should not dismiss the writ.

~

~~riefs on
~ Vf

Getting to the merits, I note at the outset that the
both sides take liberties with the opinions of the

urts below and the record.

Petitioner dwells on statistics

to do with recidivism among initial participants in
methadone maintenance programs.

These statistics are irrelevant,

however, as the district court indicated the TA could require a
one-year maintenance period to screen out potential recidivists.

,_

~

Respondents for their part depreciate the administrative and
other difficulties that a one-year ' rule would entail.

Simply

determining which patients had "successfully" passed a one-year
heroin-free period, for example, would involve perhaps
unwarranted reliance on the clinics' own policing efforts.
Other, similar problems are assumed away.
~

~~

~

~

~

I do not see how the TA's employment policy can be said

to lack a rational basis, no matter how unfair or ungenerous it
may seem.

The district court purported to apply a "rational

relation" standard of review, but its opinion
"less restrictive means" analysis.

relie~ heavily

on a

The court did not dispute

seriously that participation in a methadone program

i~n

indicium of personal instability, unreliability, and potential
future heroin abuse--

I I

\

~

in short, unemployability--

but it did

regard as essential the fact that many people who fall in this
class are employable and that the TA, by making some efforts,
could distinguish which are which.

The court depreciated the

administrative problems such further screening would entail and
seemed to regard as unfounded the TA's unwillingness to rely on
the clinics, which have a vested interest in finding jobs for
their patients.

The court seemed to have missed the point that

the Constitution does not require the TA to shoulder these extra

~'------------------'---------------~,--------------------~--------burdens,
unless some level of scrutiny greater than "rational
basis" applies.
here.

No one argues that a greater level should apply

Accordingly, I think the district court misapplied the

"rational basis" analysis.
The Second Circuit rubberstamped the district court's

""'•
equal protection argument.

Unlike the district court, however,

it did not reach the Title VII issue, as the sole basis for
reaching Title VII--

attorneys fees--

enactment of the 1976 Fees Award Act.
presents some tricky questions here.

was mooted by the
The Title VII issue
Petitioners argue that

inasmuch as Title VII rests on Congress' enforcement authority
under

§

5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it does when applied to

states and their subdivisions, it must incorporate the
constitutional requirement of purposeful discriminaton.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
of Cities v. Usery, 426

u.s.

u.s.

Compare

445 (1976), with National League

833 (1976).

There also is a

question of whether Title VII prohibits the isolated use of an
employment standard that has a discriminatory impact, where the
emplyer's overall hiring program favors minorities.

Finally, it

might be possible for the TA to introduce evidence showing that
its refusal to employ methadone maintenance patients has no
greater discriminatory impact than its broader policy of not
employing any past or present narcotics users.

In light of these

problems, I recommend deciding only the equal protection issue
and not reaching the Title VII question.

SUPPLMENTAL "BENCH "MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:
DATE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
N~w · York · city · Transit · Authority

v.

B~az~r,

No. 77-1427

December 7, 1978
I have reviewed the district court's opinion with an eye

to highlighting inconsistencies between its ultimate and
subsidiary findings of fact.

I continue to believe the most

important inconsistency in the case lies in the court's holding
on the one hand that "there are substantial numbers of persons on
methadone maintenance who are as fit for employment as other
comparable sources" (pet. app. 19a) and on the other hand that
the TA may forbid "methadone maintained persons employment in

sensitive categories such as that of subway motorman, subway
conductor, subway towerman, bus driver, and jobs dealing with
high voltage equipment." (pet. app. 67a)

If methadone maintained

persons were as · fit as others, the latter exclusion also would
lack a rational basis.

The district court, however, upheld this

purportedly irrational rule.
Also significant is the fact that the district court at
no time ruled that all methadone patients were employable.
Throughout the opinion, the court qualifies its finding with the
statement that "substantial numbers" are employable.
pet. app. 19a, 41a-42a, 46a.
finding is also true:
are not employable.
illustrative:

See,

e~g~,

The negative pregnant of this

A substantial number of methadone patients
The evidence cited in the opinion is

38 % of the City patients are unemployed, 65 % of

the ARTC patients, 20 % of the DACC patients. One study showed
that the ranged of figures for gainful employment of patients who
had been treated for at least a year ran from 63 % to 34 %. (pet.
app. 41a-42a)

This would mean that among the class of patients

which the court ordered the TA to consider for employment,
anywhere from one- to two-thirds are unemployed and, it is fair
to presume, unemployable.
The district court did not dispute that a substantial
number of methadone patients should not be employed by the TA in
any position.

What it held was that it was irrational of the TA

not to try to identify which patients were employable.
that the TA hires from other "problem" categories--

It noted

former

criminals, tranquilizer users, former mental patients, and

sufferers of diabetes, epilepsy, or heart disease.(pet. app.
47a).

For applicants or employees'in each of these categories,

the TA consulted its own staff, physicians, psychiatrists, and
other sources to determine whether an individual was employable.
(pet. app. 46a)

Similarly, the court held, the TA could use

participation in a reliable methadone program, compliance with
the rules of such programs, monitoring of drug use by such
programs, education, family ties, and employment record as
criteria for identifying employable methadone patients. (pet app.
48a)
I think there are two fundamental flaws with this
approach.

First, the criteria for culling out the unemployables
~

depend, to a significant degree, in the effectiveness of the
methadone programs in monitoring treatment.

The first three of

the criteria listed by the court, which seem by far the most
important factors, depend entirely on the clinics.

The district

court adverted to this concern, and ruled that, although some
evidence existed as to the reliability of some programs, the TA
never had tried to evaluate the reliability of any program. (pet.
app. 50a).

This, to me, seems to miss the whole point.

is entitled to be wary.

TheTA

The Constitution does not compell the TA

to experiment with different clinics, learning by hard experience
which are not to be trusted.

As long as a legitimate concern

exists, and the district court did not find that reliability was
not a proper concern, the TA is not behaving irrationally when it
decides not to run the risk.
Second, the rational basis branch of the equal

protection clause does not compel an employer who takes on

-

certain risks-- ex-cons, former mental patients, and the like-to take on all comers.
Lee · optical·co~,

348

The following language from Williamson v.

u.s!

483, 489 (1955), is appropriate here:

"The problem of legislative classification is a
perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire
definition. Evils in the same field may be of
different dimensions and proportions, requiring
different remedies. Or so the legislature may
think. • . . Or the reform may take one step at a
time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem
which seems most acute to the legislative mind.
The legislature may select one phase of one
field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the
others. • • • The prohibition of the Equal
Protection Clause goes no further than the
invidious discrimination." (citations omitted)
I appreciate your concern that "rational basis" equal
protection analysis not be entirely toothless, or that this
languaqe from Lee ·optical might itself be "overbroad".
believe that the point is applicable here:

But I do

the Constitution does

not require the TA to take on the same problems with methadone
patients that it voluntarily has taken on with ex-cons and the
l .!Js.; .

==·=~

First, it may h ave '7nouqh headaches already, and may be

unwilling to open up yet another set of problems with a different
category of employees.

Second, over the years the TA may have

developed a degree of familiarity with parole agencies, mental
hospitals, doctors, and other outsiders whom it now feels it can
trust.

This contrasts with the TA's conceded lack of experience

with methadone clinics.
The reference to Lee ·optical touches on what I perceive
to be the underlying problem in this case:
rational basis standard.

the meaning of the

My bench memorandum neglected to point

out that the district court, as well as the court of appeals,
neglected to refer to any rational'basis cases of this Court.
All of the precedent relied on below involved heightened scrutiny
in one form or another.

Thus the courts, although articulating a

rational basis test, imbued the term with a meaning this Court
has not yet given it.
I also include an excerpt from Justice Marshall's
plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392
facts here are quite different:

u.s.

514 (1968).

The

that case involved alcoholism,

while this involves narcotics, and plaintiffs here introduced
considerably more evidence about the medical issues in the case.
I think, however, that the approach taken by Justice Marshall has
some relevance to this case, inasmuch as it stresses the
difficulties of attempting to "prove" in a court of law the
answers to essentially unanswerable medical and scientific
questions.
vice.

I believe the court below was guilty of the same

I note two things about the evidence relied on below.

As

methadone was not used as a treatment for narcotics addiction
until 1963, all of what we know about methadone is fairly recent,

cfc.t·o..rr·

and none of it involves long-term effects.

"

2..r4.)

Second, with one

exception all of the witnesses cited in the district court's
opinion (and these were, I believe, the so-called independent
experts that the district court obtained on its own initiatives)
were persons who ran or promoted methadone programs and had a
vested interest in portraying them as successful.

The one

witness from Phoenix House, a non-methadone program, criticized
the efficacy of methadone treatment, but the district court

ignored or depreciated the criticisms.
In sum, I am not at all s~re the "evidence" presented in
this case was all that superior to the evidence introduced in
Powell.

Of course, the obligation to point this out is in the

first instance the TA's, and it has not met its obligation here.
But this is a constitutional case, and I am not sure this Court
should allow important questions of constitutional interpretation
to turn entirely on the failure of one party to muster all of the
evidence that supports its position, at least in an area where
the evidence involved is amenable to judicial notice •

.,

..
392 U.S.
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Opinion of

MARSHALL,

521

J.

Following this abbreviated exposition of the problem
before it, the trial court indicated its intention to disallow appellant's claimed defense of "chronic alcoholism."
Thereupon defense counsel submi-tted, and the trial court
entered, the following "findings of fact":
" ( 1) That chronic alcoholism is a disease " ·hich
destroys the afflicted person's will power to resist
the constant, excessive consumption of alcohol.
"(2) That a chronic alcoholic does not appear in
public by his own volition but under a compulsion
symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism .
"(3) That Leroy Po"·ell, defendant herein, is a
chronic alcoholic who is afflicted with the disease of
chronic alcoholism."
Whatever else may be said of them, those are not
"findings of fact" in any recogniznble, traditional sense
in which that term has been used in a court of law;
they are the premises of a syllogism transparently designed to bring this case within the scope of this Court's
opinion in Robin son v. California, 370 U. S. GGO (1962).
Noneth eless, the dissent \\·ould have us adopt these "findings" without critical examination; it would use them as
the basis for a constitutional holding that "a person may
not be punished if the condition essential to constitute
the defined crime is part of the pattern of his di sease and
is occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic of the
disease." Post, at 569.
The difficulty with that position, as \Ve shall show, is
that it goes much too far on the ba sis of too little knowledge. In the first pl ace, the record in this case is utte~
in adequate to permit the sort of informed and respon-:
sible adjudication which alone cnn support the announce-~
ment of an important and wide-ranging new con:~
stitutional principle. We know very little about the
circumstances surrounding the drinking bout which re-

...,

·'

.·

•,

522

OCTOBER TERM, 1967.
Opinion of

MARSHALL,

J.

392 U.S.

suited in this conviction, or about Ler..oy Powell's drinking
problem, or indeed about alcoholism itself. The trial
hardly reflects the sharp legal and evidentiary clash between fully prepared adversary litigants which is traditionally expected in major constitutional cases. The
State put on only one witness, the arresting officer. The
defense put on three--a policeman who testified to appellant's long history of arrests for public drunkenness, the
psychiatrist, and appellant himself.
/ Furthermore, the inescapable fact is that there is no
." · agreement among members of the medical profession
; ! about what it means to say that "alcoholism" is a "discase." One of the principal works in this field states
that the major difficulty in articulating a "disease concept
of alcoholism" is that "alcoholism has too many definitions and disease has practically none." 2 This same
author concludes that "a d1:sease is what the 1nedical profession recognizes as such." 8 In other words, there is
widespread agreement today that "alcoholism" is a "disease," for the simple reason that the medical profession
has concluded that it should attempt to treat those who
have drinking problems. There the agreement stops.
Debate rages within the medical profession as to whether
"alcoholism" is a separate "disease" in any meaningful
biochemical, physiological or psychological sense, or
whether it represents one peculiar manifestation in some
individuals of underlying psychiatric disorders. 4
Nor is there any substantial consensus as to the "manifestations of alcoholism." E. M. Jellinek, one of the
outstanding authorities on the subject, id entifies five
2

E. Jellinek, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism l1 (1960).

"!d., at 12 (emphasis in original).
4
See, e. g., Joint Information Scrv. of the Am. Psychiatric Assn. &
the Nat. Assn. for Mental Health, The Treatment of Alcoholi sm- A
Study of Programs and Problems 6-8 (1967) (hereafter cited as
Treatment of .A.Jcoholism).
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different types of alcoholics which, predominate m the
United States, and these types display a broad range
of different and occasionally inconsistent symptoms. 6
Moreover, wholly distinct types, relatively rare in this
country, predominate in natim1s with different cultural
attitudes regarding the consumption of alcohoJ.G Even
if we limit our consideration to the range of alcoholic
symptoms more typically found in this country, there
is substantial disagreement as to the manifestations of
the ''disease" called "alcoholism." Jellinek, for example,
considers that only two of his five alcoholic types can
truly be said to be suffering from "alcoholism" as a
"disease," because only these two types attain what
he believes to be the requisite degree of physiological
dependence on alcohoJ.7 He applies the label "gamma
alcoholism" to "that species of alcoholism in which
(1) acquired increased tissue tolerance to alcohol, (2)
adaptive cell metabolism ... , (3) withdrawal symptoms
and 'craving,' i. e., physical dependence, and ( 4) loss
of control are involved." 8 A "delta" alcoholic, on the
other hand, "sho·ws the first three characteristics of
gamma alcoholism as well as a less marked form of the
fourth characteristic-that is, instead of loss of control
Jellinek, supra, n. 2, at 35-41.
For example, in naiions where large quantJt1es of wine are
customarily consumed with meals, apparently there arc many people
who are completely unaware that they have a "drinking problem"they rarely if ever ~how signs of intoxication, they display no
marked symptoms of behavioral disorder, and are entirely capable
of limiting their alcoholic intake to a reasonable amount-and yet
who display severe withdrawal symptoms,. sometimes including delirimn trcmrns, \Yhen deprived of their daily portion of "·ine. M.
Block, Alcoholism-Its Facets and Phases 27 (1965); Jellinek, supra,
n. 2, at 17. See generally id., at 13-32.
7
Jellinek, su.pra, n. 2, at 40.
8 Jellinek, supra, n. 2, at 37.
5

6

OCTOBER TERM, 1967.

524

Opinion of

MARSHALL,

J.

392 U.S.

there is inability to abstain." 9 Other authorities approach the problems of classification in an entirely different manner and, taking account of the large role which
psycho-social factors seem to play in "problem drinking,"
define the "disease" in terms of the earliest identifiable
manifestations of any sort of abnormality in drinking
patterns. 10
Dr. \Vade appears to have testified about appellant's
"chronic alcoholism" in terms similar to Jellinek's
"gamma" and "delta" tnJes, for these types are largely
defined, in their later stages, in terms of a strong compulsion to drink, physiological dependence and an inability to abstain from drinking. No attempt IYas made
in the court below, of course, to determine whether Leroy
Powell could in fact properly be diagnosed as a "gamma"
or "delta" alcoholic in Jellinek's terms. The focus at
. the trial, and in the dissent here, has been exclusively
, upon the factors of loss of control and inability to abstain.
Assuming that it makes sense to compartmentalize in
this manner the diagnosis of such a formless "disease,"
tremendous gaps in our knowledge remain, which the
record in this case does nothing to fill.
The trial court's "finding" that Powell "is afflicted with
the disease of chronic alcoholism," which "destroys the
afflicted person's will power to resist the constant, excessive consun1ption of alcohol" covers a multitude of sins.
Dr. vVadc's testimony that appellant suffered from a compulsion which was an "exceedingly strong influence," but
which was "not completely overpowering" is at least more
carefully stated, if no less mystifying. Jellinek insists
that conceptual clarity can only be achieved by distinguishing carefully between "loss of control" once an individual has commenced to drink and "inability to abstain"
9

!d., at 38.

10

See Block, supra, n. 6,

3t

19-49.
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from drinking in the first place. 11 Presumably a person
would have to display both characteristics in order to
make out a constitutional defense; should one be recognized. Yet the "findings" of the trial court utterly fail to~
make this crucial distinction, Rlld there is serious question
whether the record can be read to support a finding ofj
either loss of control or inability to abstain.
Dr. Wade did testify that once appellant began drinking he appeared to have no control over the amount of
alcohol he finally ingested. Appellant's own testimony
concerning his drinking on the day of the trial would
certainly appear, however, to cast doubt upon the conclusion that he was without control over his consumption
of alcohol when he had sufficiently important reasons to
exercise such control. Ho,Yever that may be, there are
more serious factual and conceptual difficulties with
reading this record to show that appellant was unable to
abstain from drinking. Dr. Wade testified that when
appellant was sober, the act of taking the first drink was
a "voluntary exercise of his will," but that this exercise
of will was undertaken under the "exceedingly strong
influence" of a "compulsion" which was "not completely
overpowering." Such concepts, when juxtaposed in this
fashion, have little meaning.
Moreover, Jellinek asserts that it cannot accurately
be said that a person is truly unable to abstain from
drinking unless he is suffering the physical symptoms of
withdra.wal.' 2 Th ere is no testimony in this record that
Leroy Powell underwent withdrawal symptoms either
before he began the drinking spree which resulted in the
conviction under review here, or at any other time. In
attempting to deal with the al coholic's desire for drink
in the absence of withdrawal symptoms, Jellinek is re11
12

Jellinck, supra, n. 2, at 41-42.
I d., at 43.

·,
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duced to unintelligible distinctions between a "compulsion" (a "psychopathological phenomenon" which can
apparently serve in some instances as the functional
equivalent of a "craving" or symptom of wi~hdrawal)
and an "impulse" (something which differs from a loss
of control, a craving or a compulsion, and to which
Jellinek attributes the start of a new drinking bout for
a "gamma" alcoholic). 13 Other scholars are equally
unhelpful in articulating the nature of a "compulsion." 14
It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of
alcohol his hands will begin to shake, he will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he will have hallucinations;
~it is quite another to say that a man has a "compulsion"
to take a drink, but that he also retains a certain amount
;of "free will" with which to resist. It is simply impos:,sible, in the present state of our knowledge, to ascribe
~ useful meaning to the latter statement. This definitional confusion reflects, of course, not merely the undeveloped state of the psychiatric art but also the conceptual difficulties inevitably attendant upon the importation of scientific and medical models· into a legal
system generally predicated upon a different set of
assumptions. 15
II.
Despite the comparatively primitive state of our
knowledge on the subject, it cannot be denied that the
destructive use of alcoholic beY erages is one of our prin-
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Dr. Wade did not clarify matters when he testified at trial that
a chronic alcoholic suffers from "the same type of compulsion" as
a "compulsive eater."
14
See, e. g., Block, supra, n. 6, at 40, 55, 308; Treatment of
Alcoholism 6-8; Note, Alcoholism, Public Intoxication :rnd the Law,
2 Col. J. Law & Soc. Prob. 109, 112- 114 (1966).
15 See Washington v. United St(Jtes, U. S. App. D. C. - ,
- - -, 390 F. 2d 444, 446-456 (1967).
13
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MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, No. 77-1427
I am disturbed by several things in Justice Stevens'

opinion.

To take the most important first, the opinion at 2-3,

n. 3, attempts to portray this case as involving a ban against
current methadone users only.
analysis hinges on this point.

A large part of his subsequent
See p. 19 & n. 34.

Yet the

record is clear that the TA would not hire persons with a history
of methadone use, apart from any present use.

The TA's answer

admitted that it does "not employ persons who use or have a
history of using narcotic drugs, including methadone."

App. 60A.

2.

The TA's brief summarizes testimony by one of its officials
indicating that the TA would not consider an applicant until he
had been free of methadone use for over five years.
Petitioners 5.

Brief of

Further, the district court found that, "It is

clear that a relatively recent methadone user would be subject to
the blanket exclusionary policy."

Pet. App. 18a.

That paragraph

goes on to say that the only "unclarity" with respect to this
policy is whether applicants will be considered after five years
of freedom from methadone use.

There is no dispute that until an

applicant or employee has been free of use for at least five
years, he comes within the TA's policy.
What Justice Stevens may mean to say is that none of the
named plaintiffs had standing to attack the policy except as it
applied to current users.

Beazer, however, ceased using

methadone in November 1973, and Frasier quit in March 1973.
Beazer was fired while he was still on methadone, while Frasier
was denied employment once while he was on methadone, and again a
month after he had quit.

Both presumably were ready and willing

to reapply for TA jobs at the time the district court entered its
order in August 1975;

otherwise I do not see how they had

standing to obtain any prospective relief.

By that date both had

been off heroin for over a year but, under the conceded terms of
TA's policy, would not be considered for employment.
see why, under these facts, Beazer

~nd

I do not

Frasier would have to

reapply and get turned down in order to have standing to attack
the exclusionary policy with respect to former methadone users.
In short, I think Justice Stevens has ducked the hard

3.
question presented by this case:

To what extent may the TA,

consistently with the equal protection clause, deny employment to
persons who once used methadone, but currently are free of all
drug use.

Furthermore, I .think the means Justice Stevens has

used to duck that question cannot be sustained on this record.
Footnotes 23 and 24 on pages 13 and 14
problems.

~

present

In note 23 he says white methadone users "presumably

do not have standing in this case under Title VII or§ 1981".

I

am not sure this is incorrect, but I would like to know why.

It

may be that he means that the policy does not have a
discriminatory impact on whites, and that both Title VII and
1981 prohibit only racially based discrimination.
would be better if he said that.

§

I think it

More troubling is his treatment

of the County of Los Angeles v. Davis issue in these footnotes.
What he seems to be saying is that it is unnecessary in this case
to decide whether
discrimination.

§

1981 requires proof of purposeful

But the language he chose is ambiguous, and

could be read as implying

§

1981 does not require anything more

than Title VII in the way of a prima facie case.
I do not recall that the conference discussion went to
the Title VII issue, and I am surprised he went to its merits.
do not question the result, but I would like to reread what he
says on this point.
Some of these problems can be taken care of with some
simple language changes.

The more fundamental point-

whether

exclusion of past users is in this case- probably will present
greater problems.

If the Court accepts Justice Stevens'

I

4.
analysis, I suggest that you consider writing separately.
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Dear John:
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Stevens
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77-1427
New York City Transit Authority)On Writ of Certiorari to
et al., Petitioners,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the SecCarl A. Beazer et al.
ond Circuit.
[February -, 1979]

MR.

delivered the opinion of the Court.
The New York Transit Authority refuses to employ persons
who use methadone. The District Court found that this
policy violates the Equal Protf'ction Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In a subsequent opinion, the court also held
that the policy violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The Court of Appeals affirmed without reaching the
statutory question. The departure by those courts from the
procedure normally followed in addressing statutory and constitutional questions in the same case, as well as concern that
the merits of these important questions had been decided
erroneously, led us to grallt certiorari.1 U. S. - . We
now reverse.
1

JusTICE STEVENS

Rule 19 of thr Hult-1-1 of tlw Supn·me Court provides :

·'CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
"1. A review ou writ of et-rtioran i~ not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial diserrtion, and will lw granted onl~· whf're thrn· arr i:iJWCial nnd
important rrason~ thrrrfor. Thr following, whilr neithrr controlling nor
fully lll(':tsuring the court ·~ di~<·rrtion, indrcate the charactrr of rm:,om
whieh will lJe ('(lll~ider<'d :
, . (h) Wlwr·r a court of apprab . .. lm,; decidrd a fedrral qurstion in a
way m conflict with apJllicable d!'cisioni:i of thi~ court; or has so far departrd from the aceeptrd a11d uswd com~e of jndieial proerrdings, or so

JAN 30 79
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The Tra11sit Authority (TA) operates the subway system
and certain bus lines i11 New York City. It employs about
47,000 persons, of whom many-perhaps most-are employed
in positions that involve danger to themselves or to the public.
For exan'lple, some 12,300 are subway motormen, towermen,
conductors, or bus operators. The District Court found that
these jobs are attended by unusual hazards and must be performed by ''persons of maximmn alertness and competence.'~
399 F. Rupp. 1033, 1052. Certai11 other jobs. such as operating cranes and handling high voltage equipment, are also
considered "critical." or "sa.fety sensitive," while still others,.
though classified as "non-critical.'' have a potentially important impact on the overall operation of the transportation
system.2
TA enforces a general policy against employing persons
who use narcotic drugs. The policy is reflected in Rule 11 (b)
of TA's Rules and Regulations.
"Employees must not use. or have in their possession,
narcotics, tranquilizers, drugs of the Amphetamine group
or barbiturate derivatives or paraphernalia used to administer narcotics or barbiturate derivatives, except with
the written permission of the Medical Director-Chief
Surgeon of the System."
Methadone is regarded as a narcotic within the meaning of
Rule 11 (b). No written permission has ever been given by
T A's Medical Director for the employment of a person using
methadone}
far :-;anrtionrd such n departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercis<> of thiH court'~ ~up<:'rviHion ."
2 Thns, about 13 ,400 emplo:VP<'S arc involved in the maintenance of
~mbway carR, hui'iE'H, trnck, tunnrb, :mel structurrs. Another 5,600 work in
subway ~tations, and owr 2,000 arc eng:1ged in office ta~ks that ineludf~ ·
the handling of large HUm~ of money. TA hire~ about :3,000 new employees
<:'aeh year.
8 By ihi tt•rms, Hule 11 (h) dOP~ not apply to per~ons who formerly ·
u~ed mt:thadone or. any other d1·ug, and _thr Di~trict Court did not find·
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The District Court found that methadone is a synthetic
narcotic and a central nervous system depressant. If injected
into the blood stream with a needle, it produces essentially
the same effects as heroin. 1 Methadone has been used legitimately in at least three ways-as a pain killer, in "detoxificathat TA had any gf'l1t>ral polic)' covering former users. On the contrary,
the court found that "It Ihe :situation is not <'Titirely clear with respect to
the policy of the TA regarding per:;on~ who have successfully concluded
participation in n methadone program." 399 F. Supp., at 1036.
Although it did not :;rttle the quP:,;1ion of what policy TA enforces in
this m:;pect, the Di;;trict Conrt included former users in the plaintiff
claHS. It thrn afford('cl thrm rrlwf from any blanket exrln;;ionary policy
that TA might rnforcr, although, again, the ;;upporting factual findings
were admittrdly " not Lba;;ed on] a grrat deal" of evidence. !d., at 1051.
TA contrnd~ that thr meager evidrncr rrcrivrd at trial on the " former
u;;rr:s" i~sur wa:s in:sufficirnt to support eithrr the clas;; or rrlirf determination~ made with rr:;prct to thos<' persom:1 . Wf.' go further. As far as we
are aware there wa:; no rvidruce offf.'rrcl at trial, and certainly nonf.' rrlied
upon by thr Di;;trict Court, that TA actually rrfu:::~rcl employmrnt to any
former user entitl<>cl to rrlirf under the injunction ordf.'red by that court.
(The one namt'd plaintiff who wa~ a former user had not completed a full
year of methadone maintPnHIH'e and could therefore be excluded under the
lujunctiou .)
It follow~ that neither tlH' finding~ of fact, nor thP record evidence,
squarely presents any issuf' with respPct to former user8 that must be
re:;olvrd in ordPr to di:;po:;e of this litigation. A policy excluding all
former uRPrs would be hardrr to ju~tify than a policy applicable only to
person:; currrntly receiving trratmpnt. A court should not reach out to
expre:::~s an opimon on thP con~titutionality of such a policy unless necessary
to adjudiCatf' a concn•te dispute betwren adven;r litigants. We shall therefore confinr our consideration to the legality of TA's enforcement of its
l{ulr 11 (b) again~t rurreut UHf'r~ of mrthadone.
·1 '·Hrroin i;; a narcotie which i~ genPrally injected into tl1f' bloodstream
by a JwedlP. It i~ a crntral nervouH systPm depre~Si::iant. Thr usual rffect
i~ to c·rratP n ' high'-Puphorin, drowsme:::~s-for about thirty minutE's, which
then taprr~ off ovPr a penod of about threr or four hour~. At thr end of
t hi~ tim<> t hP hermn u~er rxpPnf'nee~ ~rckne::;s and di:scomfort known as
'wrthdrawal ":vmptom~.' There i" intt'n:;e cravmg for anothf.'r ~hot of
heroin, after winch thr cyclP ,.;iarts over again. A typical addict will inject
heroin J:;f'V('fll[ tunes a day." a99 F. Hupp., at

was.
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tion units" of hospitals as an immediate means of taking·
addicts off of heroin," and in long range "methadone maintenance programs" as part of a permanent cure for heroin
addiction. See 21 CFR ~ 310.304 (b) (1978). In such programs the methadone is taken orally in regula.r doses for a
prolonged period. As so administered. it does not produce
euphoria or any pleasurable effects associated with heroin; on
the contrary, it prPvents users from experiencing those effects
when they injrct heroin, and also alleviates the severe and
prolonged discomfort otherwise associated with an addict's
discontinuance of the usP of heroin.
About 40,000 persons rpceive methadone maintenance treatment in New York City, of whom about 26,000 participate
in the five major public or semi-public programs, 0 and 14,000
are involved in about 25 private programs.' The sole purpose
" TlH' Di~triet Comt found that detoxifieation is arcompli::;hed "by
switching n hE'roin addH:t to mrthadonr and gradually reducing thE' do::;es
of ml'thndonr to zrro ovrr a prriod of about threE' weE'ks. The patiE'nt
thu~ drtoxifiPd i~ drug frrP. :\1orpover, it i~ hoprd that the program of
graduall~· redueed do~rs of mrthadonr leavE':; him without thr withdrawal
~ympto11". or thr 'phy:;ieal drp('l)denee' on :t narcotic." 399 F . Supp ., at
10:38.
0 ''The fiv e major public• or srmi-public methadone maintenance program~ 1ll Xew York City arr :
" (1) Brth l srarl program ... with :1:3 clinic!' treating 7100 patients ;
''(2) A program admim~tPred hy tllf' City of New York with :39 clinic~
treatmg 12 ,400 patirnt~ (herpaftE'r referred to as 'the City program') ;
" (3) A program ndmini::>tPrrd by thr Bronx State Hospital and the Albert
Einstrin Collt>~~:r of l\IE'dicinr, with 7 clinic~ treating about 2400 patirnt~;
" (4) A program opE'rated b~ · tlJP Addiction He~earch and TrE'atmE'nt CE'ntc>r (AHTC) with 6 clinic~ trrating ahout 1200 patiE'nts; and
" (5) A program OJwrHtrd hy the 'XE'w York StatE' Drug Abuse Control
C onllm~~ion (DACC). with ~ rlimc~ trPating about 1100 patients.
''Thr total HumbC'r of patiPnt~ trrated in public or ~cmi-public programs
i:-; about :W,OOO. Il apprar~ that thrsr program:; arr financed almo::;t
entirE'])· b~· !'C'drral, statr nnd rtt~· fund~." 399 F. Supp., at 1040.
'·· 1_v jpry 1Lt11C' ~JWritic information wa~ providrd rat trial] regarding-

77-1427-0PINION
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of all these programs is to cure the addiction of persons who
have been using heroin for at least two years.
Methadone maintenance treatment in New York is largely
governed by regulations promulgated by the New York Drug
Abuse Control Commission. Under the regulations, the newly
accepted addict must first be detoxified, normally in a hospital.
A controlled daily dosage of methadone is then prescribed.
The regulations require that six doses a week be administered
at a clinic, while the seventh day's dose may be taken at
home. If progress is satisfactory for three months, additional
doses may be taken away from the clinic, although throughout most of the program. which often lasts for several years,
there is a minimum requiremeut of three clinic appearances a
week. During these visits, the patient not only receives his
doses but is also counseled and tested for illicit use of drugs. 8
The evidence indicates that methadone is an eft'ective cure
for the physical aspects of heroin addiction. But the District
Court also found "that many persons attempting to overcome
the private clinics." 399 F. Supp., at 1046. What evid!:'nce there was
indicated that thosE' clinics WE're lik!:'ly to bE' IE'sS successful and less able
to provide accurate information about their clients than the public clinics.
/d., at 1046, 1050.
8 Although the Unit!:'d States Food and Drug Administration h11s also
is::;u!:'d r!:'gulations in this area, 21 CFR §§ 291.501, 291.505 (1978), the
New York State regulations are as or morE' :stringE'nt and thus effectively
set thE' rel!:'vant standards for the authorized methadone maintenance program:; involved m thi:; case. Under those regulations, in-clinic ingestion
of methadone must be observ!:'d by staff members, NYCRR § 2021.13 (b),
and must occur with a frequency of six days a week during the first three
months, no l!:'s;; than three days a week thereafter through the second year
of treatmE'nt, and two days a week thereafter. !d.. § 2021.13 (a) ( 1).
Test:; are requirE'd io prevent hoarding of take-home doses, excessive use
of methadone, and illicit use of oth!:'r drugs or alcohol, any of which, if
found, can r!:'~ult in mcrcas!:'d chnic-v1sit frequency or in termmation from
thr program. !d., §§2021.13 (c)(2), 20'21.13 (g). The programs are also
required to include "a comprehensive range of rehabilitative services on-site
under profe;;sional ;;upervision,'' id, § 2021.13 (3), although participation
in many of these i:H.'rvices is voluntary and Irregular.

77-1427-0PINION
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heroin addiction have psychological or lifestyle problems
which reach beyond what can be cured by the physical taking
of doses of methadone." 399 F. Supp .. at 1039. The crucial
indicator of successful nwthadone mai11tenance is the patient's
abstinence from the illegal or excessive use of drugs and
alcohol. The District Court found that the risk of reversion
to drug or alcohol abuse declines dramatically after the first
few months of treatment. Indeed, "the strong majority" of
patie11ts who have been on methadone maintenance for at
least a year are free from illicit drug use. 0 But a significant
number are not. On this critical point. the evidence relied
upon by the District Court reveals that even among participants with more than 12 months' tenure in methadone maintenance programs. the iuciclence of drug and alcohol abuse
may often approach and evell exceed 25% .10
This litigation was brought. by the four respondents as a
class action on behalf of all persons who have been. or \\·ould
in the future be, subject to discharge or rejection as employees
of TA by reasou of participation in a methadone maintenance
program. Two of the responde11ts are former employees of
TA who were dismissed while they were receiving methadone·
v ''l concludE' from all the evidetH'f' that the strong majority of meUmdone maintained pN~on;:; an• sueees>Sful, at lra~t after tlw initial period of
adju~Stment, in kerping t hem~Plves frer of the usr of hc~roin, other iUicit
drug~ . and problem drinking." 399 F . Supp., at 1047.
10 Thu~S, for example :
" Dr. Trigg of BPth r~rael testified that about 5,000 out of the 6,500--7,000
patient~ in hi~ clinics have brPn on mPthadone ma.intPnance for a year or
morP. He further te~tified th<tt 75W of this 5,000 an• free from illi<'it drug
u~e ." :199 F. Supp., at 1046.
Similar]~·, althou~h

the figure~ tna~· be ~omrwhat higher for the Cit~· and
Bronx State Hospital progmm~. onl~· 70% of the AHTC patiPtlt~ with a
yrttr '~ tenure or more wrrr found to ur frep from illicit drug or aleohol
use. It i~ rea~onable to infPr from thi~ evid('l1e<' that auywherP from 20
to 20% of thoHe who haV<' bern Oil maintenance for over a year havedrug or alcohol problem::;.
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treatment. 11 The other two were refused employment by TA,
one both shortly before and shortly after the successful conclusion of his methadone treatment/" a.nd the other while he
was taking methadone. 13 Their complaint alleged that TA's
blanket exclusion of all former heroin addicts receiving methadone treatment was illegal under the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000 et seq., and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The trial record contains extensive evidence concerning the
success of methadone maintenance programs, the employability of persons taking methadone, and the ability of prospective employers to detect drug abuse or other undesirable
characteristics of methadone users. In general, the District
Court concluded that there are substantial numbers of methadone users who are just as employable as other members of
the general population and that normal personnel screening
procedures-at least if augmented by some method of obtaining information from the staffs of methadone programs--would
enable TA to identify the unqualified applicants on an individual basis. 399 F. Supp., at 1048-1051. On the other
hand, the District Court recognized that at least one-third of
the persons receiving methadone treatment-r-and probably a·
11 Re~pondent Beazer waR dismis8ed in November 1971 when his heroin
addiction became known to TA and shortly after he enrolled in a methadone maintenance program; he r,;ncces8fully terminated his . treatment in
November 197:3. Respondent Reye" began his methadone treatment in
1971 and was dismissed by TA in 1972. At the time of trial, in 1975, he
was still participating in a methadone program.
12 Hrspondent. Frasier wa8 on methadone maintenance for only "five
months, from October 1972 until March 1973. TA refu8ed to employ him
as a bus operator in March 1973 and as a bus cleaner in April 1973.
ts Respondent Diaz entered a methadone maintenance program in
December 1968 and was ~till receiving treatment at the time of trial. He
was refusrd errlJ))oyment ns a maintenance helper in 1970.

77-1427-0PINION
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good many more-would unquestionably pe classified as·
unemployable. 14
After extensively reviewing the evidence, the District Court
briefly stated its conclusion that TA's methadone policy is
unconstitutional. The conclusion rested on the legal proposition that a public entity "cannot bar persons from employment on the basis of criteria which have no rational relation
to the demands of the job to be performed." 399 F. Supp.,
at 1057. Because it is clear that substantial numbers of
methadone users are capable of performing many of the jobs
at T A, the court held that the Constitution will not tolerate a
blanket exclusion of all users from all jobs.
The District Court enjoined TA from denying employment
to any person solely because of participation in a methadone
maintenance program. Recognizing, however, the special re. sponsibility for public safety borne by certain TA employePs
and the correlatio11 between longevity in a methadone lllaintenance program and performance capability. the injunction
authorized TA to exclude methadone users from specific
categories of safety-sensitive positions and also to condition
eligibility on satisfactory performance in a methadone pro.gram for at least a year. In other words, the court held that
TA could lawfully adopt geueral rules excluding all methadone
14 The District Court summarized the testimony concerning one of the
largest and most ::mccesl:lful public programs:
"The witnesr:;es from the Beth Ir:;rael program te:;tified that about onethird of the patients in that program, after a short period of adjustment,
nPed very little more than the doses of methadone. The persons in this
category are situated fairly sati:sfactorily with respect to matter:; such
a::; family ties, education and jobs. Another one-third of the patients at
Beth I::;raE:l need a moderate amount of rehabilitation service, including
vorational assi:stance, for a period of several month:; or about a year. A
person in this category may , for instancP, have fini:,;hed high school , but
may have a long heroin history and no employment record. A final onethird of the patients at Beth hrael need intensive supportive Hervices, are
performing in the program marginally, and either will be discharged or wi!I
be on the brink of discharge ." 399 F. Supp., at 1048 .

.,
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users from some jobs and a large number of methadone users
from all jobs.
Almost a year later the District Court filed a supplemental
opinion allowing respondents to recover attorneys fees under
42 U. S. C. ~ 2000e-5 (k). This determination was premised
on the court's additional holding that TA's drug policy violated Title VII. Having already concluded that the blanket
exclusion was not rationally related to any business needs of
TA, the court reasoned that the statute is violated if the
exclusionary policy has a discriminatory effect against blacks
nnd Hispanii'P. Thn,t effect was proyen. in t.be District f'ourt's
view, by two sLa.Listictl: (1) of Lhe employees referreJ Lo TA's
medical consultant for suspected violation of its drug policy,
81% are black or Hispa11ic; (2) between 62% and 65% of all
methadone maintained persons in New York City are black or
Hispanic. 414 F. Supp. 277, 278-279. The Court. however,
did not find that TA's policy was motivated by any bias
against blacks or Hispanics; indeed. it expressly found that
the policy was not adopted with a discriminatory purpose.
/d., at 279.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's constitutional holding. While it declined to reach the statutory
issue, it also affirmed the award of attorneys fees under the
aegis of the recently enacted Civil Rights Attorneys Fee
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. ~ 1988, which provides adequate support for an award of legal fees to a party prevailing
on a constitutional claim. 1 5
H• Thr Court of Appeal:,; rever»rd the Di»trict Court on onr i:>l:iue relating to rehrf. The lower court had denied reinstatement and back-pay
relief to two of the four named plaintiffs because they adm1ttrd having
violat(:'d TA's unquestionably valid rule against taking heroin while being
in TA's employ . Pet. for Ct>rt., at 77a-78a . The Court of Appeals n•versed . It determined that the two plamtiffs' former heroin use and violation of TA '~ rult>:> on that account were 1rrelevant because TA explicitly
prerrust>d the1r firing exclu::;JvPly on thPir u.sc of methadone. 558 F . 2d
97, ai lO t
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After we granted certiorari, Congress amended the Reba-.
bilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 700 et seq., to prohibit,
discrimination against a class of "handicapped individuals"
that arguably includes certain former drug abusers and certain
current users of methadone. PulJ. L. 95-251, 95th Cong., 2d
$ess. Respondents arguf' that the amendment now mandates
at least the prospective relief granted by the District Court.
and the Court of Appeals and that we should therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. We are satisfied,
however. that we should decide the constitutional questiou
presented by the petition. BeforP doing so. we shall discuss
( 1) the efff'ct of the Rehabilitation Act on this case; and
(:2) the error in the District Court's analysis of Title VII.

. I
Respondf'nts contend that the recent amendment to § 7 (6)
of the Rehabilitatio11 Act proscribes TA 's enforcement of a
general rule denying em ploymcn t to methado11e users.'" Even
Section 50-1 of thr Hrhahilitation Act, :.!9 U.S. C. § 794, provides:
qualifi<'<i handicapprcl individual in the United State~, a:;
'Cfpfinrct in ~e('t ion 706 (li) of thi~ titlr, shall, solely by re11son of his handirap, he excluded from tlH' participation in, be denied the bPnefit::> of, or
be : > uhj Pcled to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial ii::)Hi::>tancc."
It i:; :;tipula trd that tlw T A receive:; fpdrrnl financial a":;ii-:1 a nee.
In relevant part, § 7 (6) of the Act, 29 l' . S. C. § 700 (6), al:l amended ,
provide::; .
"The term ' handieapped individual' ... mean:; any JH'r:;on who (A) hu::;
<t phy~iral or mental impnirm!-'nt which ~ub~hmtinlly limits one or more
of ~urh prr~on 'H major life aetivitie~ , (B) ha~ a record of :;urh an impairmrnt, or (C) i,.; regardrd a~ having ~ uch an impairment.
" .. . For purpo~r:; of ~<·ction:; 50:{ nne! 504 ns surh :;ertion~ rela1<' to
c· mployment , :-;nch term doe~ not include nny individual who i~ an alcoholic
or drug nbul"er who~e ('llff<'nt ttHe of nlcohol or dmg-:-; pr<'vent~ t<ttrh individual from performin~~: tlw dtttie" of thr job in que::;tion or who:;e employment , by rpa:;on of ::;uch current alcohol or drug abuse, would ron~titutP a
'tlirrct threat to property or thr :;afet ·of otlwr:;."
w

· · ~o otlll'rwi~e
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if respoudents correctly interpret the amendment, and even
if they have a right to enforce that interpretation," the case
is not moot since their claims arose even before the act itself
was passed/" aud they have been awarded monetary relief.' 0
Moreover. the language of the statute, even after its amendment, is not free of ambiguity/ 0 and no administrative or
judicial opinions specifically considering the impact of the
statute on methadone users have been called to our atteution.
Of greater importance. it is perfectly clear that however we
might construe the Rehabilitation Act. the concerns that
prompted our grant of certiorari would still merit our attention.~'
WE' therefore decline to give the sta.tute its first judicial construction at this stage of the litigation.
The qu<•stiou whrth<·r n cau~r of action on behalf of handicapJJ<'d
may be· implird undt'r § 504 of thr Ht>habilitation Act will be>
nddn·~,;rd by j hi~ Courj iu 8outhea~tf'rn Cornmuuity College v. Davis,
No . 78--711, <'e'rt. grantrd .la11. K, 1979.
J.o The lntesj ad of ai!Pged di~crimination cited in re:;pondrnt~' l'omplaint
oermTed in April 197:~, whilr tht' Art wa~ pass<>d on 8Pptembrr 26, 197:~,
Pub. L. 9:~-112, Titlr V, and the am<-'ndment to§ 7 (6) went into effpcj in
Novt'mb<'r (\ , 1978.
1u 8<'<' n. 17, supra .
20 In ordrr for HlP Di"trict Court'~ finding:; to bring the rPHpondPnt clas~
eonclusivrl~ - within jh<' Act, wr would havP to find that denying emplo~·
meul to a mPthadonP u::;er lH'rausP of thaj u~P amounts to excluding an
"otll(>rwise qualified handicappPd individual .. . ;-;olrly by rPa~on of his
handi<·ap ." Among othpr i~~tws, thi,- would require u~ to detpnnin<'
(1) whPOwr 11f'roin addicts or C\IIT('llt rnPthadonP n~Pr" qualif~· a::; ''hanclic·app\'< me Ividuall sl i. t' .. whP1hcr th::d addiction or Uti<' i"' (or is
pPrrrived a::;) a " physical impairment which ;;ub;;tantiall~- limit~ one or
more ... major life funrtiou::;"; (2) wlwthPr nwthadone use prevents the
individual '·from JWrforming HlP dntie:; of the job" or "would constitute a
direcj jhretd to Jll'OJWrty or tlw Hafet~· of others" ; and (3) whetht>r themc·tnber::; of the l'P~pondPnt ria"~ arP "otherwi~r qualified"-th<> meaning of
which phrase i"' nt i~~U<' in Southeastern Community Collegl' v. Davis,
Xo . 78-711, cP!'t . granted .Jan . . 1979.
21 Sre ante, at 11. 1 and :trrompauyiug jext.
HP~pondent,; ma~' Pxaggemte th<> degrP<' to whirh I hr recent nmeudmrnt nlterrd thr law a"' it
17

person~
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Although respondents have consistently relied on both statutory and constitutional claims. the lower courts focused
primarily ·on the latter. Thus. when the District Court
decided the Title VII issue, it did so only as an afterthought
in order to support an award Qf attorneys fees; the Court of
Appeals did not even reach the Title VII issue. We do not
condone this departure from settled federal practice. "If
there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in
the process of constitutional adjudica.tion, it is that we ought
not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such
adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105. Before deciding the constitutional question, it was incumbent on those courts to consider
whether the statutory grounds might be dispositive. 22 Whatexisted when we granted C('rtiorari. Ev('n before the Court of Appeal~
heard argument in this ca~e, in fact, the Attorney Gem~ral of the United
States had isHued an interpretation of the Act as it then existed which
concluded that the Act ''does iu general prohibit discrimination against
alcoholic;; and drug addicts in federally-aH:oisted program~ .... " Opinion
of the Honorable Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States
to Honorable Joseph A. Califano, Seeretary, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, April 12, 1977. Re~:>pondents brought this interpretation to our attention before we granted certiorari. Brief in Opposition to
Certiorari, at A5-A6.
22
"From Haybum's Case, 2 Dall. 409, to Alma Mota!' Co. v. TimkenDetroit Axle Co. and the Hatch Act case decided this term, this Court has
followed a policy of ::;trict nece:osity in disposing of constitutional issue::;.
The earli(':ot exemplifications, too well known for repeating the history here,
aro::;e in the Court's refusal to render advisory opinions and in applications
of the related jurisdictional policy drawn from the case and controver:oy
limitation. U.S. Const., Art. III. ..•
"The policy, however, ha~ not been limited to jmi~dictional determinations. For, in addition, 'i he Court rhasl developed, for its own governance in thf CHHt'~ confessedly within itR jurisdiction, a series of rules under
which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all tlw constitutional
questions pres::>ed upon It for decision .' Thus, as those rules were listed
·in :;upport of the st<~tement quoted, con,;titutional is;;ues affecting legisla-
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ever their reasons for not doing so, 23 we shall first dispose of
the Title VII issue. 24
The District Court's findings do not support its conclusion
tion will not be determined in friendly, nonadven;~u~· proreedingR: in
advance of the necrs::lity of drciding them; in broader terms than are
required by the precise fHrt~ to which the ruling is to be applied; if the
record pre~ent~ some other ground upon which thr case rna~· be dispo~rd
of; at the instance of on<> who fail~ to show that he iR injured by the
statute's operation, or who baH availed himself of it;,; benefits; or if a construction of the ~tatute i~ fair!~· po~sible by which the que:stion may be
avoided." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-569 (footnotes omitted), quoting Ash u•ander· v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (Brandeis,
J ., concmring) .
23 Respondent~ suggrst thai th<> lower courts propPrly reached the ronstitutional Issue first becan~<' onl~· under the Equal Protection Clause could
all of the cla:;s members, including white methadon<> user;,; (who prrsumably do not have ::;tanding in this cas<> undrr Title VII or § 1981)
obtain all of the relief including backpay, sought in their complaint. In
addition, they point to TA'"' argument that Tit!P VII nnd § 1981 are
unconstituhonal insofar as they authorize relief against a statr subdivision
without any direct allegation or proof of intrntional discrimination. cr.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445; National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833; Washington\'. Davis, 426 U.S. 229; Fry v. United States.
421 U. S. 542; Katzenbadt v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641. Under this latter
point, it is argued that til<' District Court quite properly drcided to addre~s
1he con:-;titutionality of n municipal agrncy's hiring practices brfore
addre~;smg the constitutional it~ · of two Ach; of Congr<'S:>.
Whatrvpr thr theoretiral validity of respondents' explanationR for the
action~ of the Diotrict Comf nnd th<> Comt of Appeal~, the fact r<'mains
.that W<' arP forced to speculnte about what motivated thPm because they
never explained their haste to address a naked constitutional issue despite
the presence in the rase of alternative statutory theories. It also bears
noting that in its second opinion the District Court did decide that TA's
policy violated a federal statute, ami its decision, without addrro:sing any
con~titutional i~sue, provided a :-;tatutory basi:; for virtually all of the relief
that it ultnnately awarded. Had it ronfront<'d the iosue, therefore, it,
presumably would have concluded that it could have drcided the case
without addre:-;,.;ing the ronHtitutional iH~ur on which it initially decided the
case.
21 Although thr t>xnct applirnbilit~· of§ 1981 in ra~rH Hurh a" this has not
hPell deridPd h~ ' thi~ Comt, and was not rearhed h ' either of the rourt~
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-that TA's regulation prohibiting the use of narcotics, or its:
interpretation of that regulation to encompass users of meth1\.done, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
A prima facie violation of the Act may be established by
statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has
the effect of denying the members of one race equal access to
employment opportunities. ~ Because the two statistics on
which respondents and the District Court relied are incapable
of proving that T A's rule had a disparate effect on blacks and
Hispanics, the Title VII threshold has not been crossed in
this case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S ..
2

792, 802. 26

First, the District Court noted that 81 %· of the employees
referred to T A's medical director for suspected violation of its.
narcotics rule were either black or Hispanic. But respondents
have only challellged the rule to the extent that it is construed
to apply to methadone users, and tha.t statistic tells us
nothing about the racial composition of the employees suspected of using methadone. 27 Nor does the record give us
below, it serm~ clrar that it affords no grrat('r ~~~b~tantive protection
than Title VII. Accordingly, our trratmrnt of the Titlr VII claim al:;o
di~pose:; of thr § 1981 claim without nrf•ri of a rrmand.
2
" "Statisticl'i arr ... romprtent in proving rmployment discrimination.
W f:' caution only that stati~tic:-; arf:' not irrf:'futable; thr~· comr in infinite
variety and, likr any othrr kind of rvidencP, thry may br rrbutted. In
short, thrir usefulnf:'~s drpf:'nd~ on all thr :<urrounding facts and circumstance~ . '' Teamsters \'. United States, 413 U. S. 324, 3:39-340 (footnote·
omitted) .
(
2
" Breau:;<' of this holding, we need not addres~ thr constitutiona l chal- .
lenge madf:' by TA to Titlf:' VII insofar as it authorizf:'" rf:'lief again::;t a
municipal agenry undrr thr circumstances of thi:s case . Ser n. 2:3, supr-a.
21 Indeed, it i~ probable that none of the rmployers rompri~ing thi~
81 % were mrthadone usrr" . The part irs :;tipulated that :
"TA rmploypf:',.; :;bowing physi<'al manife:;tatiom; of drug abusr other than
the definite pre:;rnce of morphine or methadone or othrr illicit drug in theurine arr rPfrrred to [the mrdical dirrctor_l for consultation .. .. " App.,.
at 86A (rmphal'iis addrd) .
In view of thi:; :stipulation and thr Di:strict Court '::; finding th11t few if any-

•
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any information about the number of black, Hispanic, or
white persons who were dismissed for using methadone.
Second, the District Court noted that about 63% of the
persons in New York receiving methadone maintenance are
blacl< or Hispanic. We do not know. however, how many of
these persons ever worked or sought to work for T A. This
statistic therefore reveals little if anything about the racial
composition of the class of TA job applicants and employees
receiving methadone treatment. More particularly, it tells us
11othing about the class of otherwise-qualified applicants and
employees who have participated in methadone maintenance
programs for over a year-the only class improperly excluded
by T A's policy under the District Court's analysis. The
record demonstrates, in fact. that the figure is virtually irrelevant because a substantial portion of the persons included in
it are either unqualified for other reasons-such as the illicit
use of drugs and alcohol ~'-or have received successful assistance in finding jobs with employers other than TA. The
evidence simply does 11ot establish that TA's policy has had
a greater effect on the members of one race than another.'w
physical

manife~tatiou><

of drug abuse characterize methadone maintained
F. Supp., at 1042- 1045, it seems likely that ~uch per~on~
would not be included in the i'itati~tical pool referred to by the District
Court.
28 To demon:st rate employability, the District Court referrrd to a study
indicating that 34 to 59 % of the methadone u~ers who have been in a
maintenance program for a ;mbstantial period of time are unemployed.
The evidencr wa~ inconclusive with respect to all methadone u~er~. :399
.F. Supp., at 1047. However, the director of the :second largest program
in New York City test ified that only 33% of the entire methadone patient
populatiOn in that program were employabl<>. Trial Transcript, January 10, 1975 , at :H5. On the :,;tati:,;tic~ relating to illicit u~e of drugs and
nlcohol, :;eP ante, at 7.
20 "[EJvideuce :,;bowing that the figure:; for the general population might
not accurate!~· reflect the pool of qualified job applicants" will render these
figureR uselr:s:; m makmg out a prima facie case." 1'eamste1·s v. United
States. supra, .t:n (T , S., at :340 11 . 20. Thit>, of CO\II':>e, is not to ~ay ''that
a ~tat1~tiral ~bowing of di~proportionat<> impact mu~t alwayi'i bP ba~ed on
per!"OP~. :~99

r
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We conclude that respondents failed to prove a prima facie
violation of Title VII. We therefore must reach the constitutional issue.

III
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deny to any person within
it's jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Clause
announces a fundamental principle: the State must govern
impartially. General rules that apply evenhandedly to all
persons within the jurisdiction unquestionably comply "·ith
this principle. Only whrn a govrrnmental unit adopts a rule
that has a special impact on less than all the persons subject
to its jurisdiction does the question whether this principle is
violatrd arise.
In this case, TA 's Rule 11 (b) places a meaningful rest ric.,.
tion on all of its employees and job applicants; in that sense
the rule is one of general applicability ami satisfies the equal
protection principlr without further inquiry. The District
Court, however, interpreted the rule as applicable to the
limited class of persons who regularly use narcotic drugs,
including nwthadone. As so interpreted, we arc necessarily
confronted with the question 'vvhether the rule reflects an
impermissiblP bias against a special class.
RespondPnts have neVf'r questioned the validity of a special
rule for all users of narcotics. Rather, they originally conau

annJ ., ·~i~

of thr

rharart<•ri~tie~

of

aetu::~l

applicants."

Rawlinsou . .t:3:l U. 8. a21, 3:30. Dot hard rpjeeted

an~· ~uch

Dothard v.

rrquirrment
hrrau::w t!H' rxi,.;t('l1P<' of thr allrg<•dl~· di~criminator~· hiring prartice ma.v
it,.;rlf ,.;k<'W thr pool of actual applicant,.; h~· di~couraging many otllf'rwi~r
qualified JWrson~ from appl~· ing . What wr an' ::;n~·iug i~ tlwt in this ca~<'
tlH're "is rPa~on to supposr " that thr chara!'teri,ties of the two Ht::~ti,.;tiral
group~ n·lied on h~· rr,.;pond!'nl,.; do "diffrr mnrkedl)·" from t]l(' rharactrri:;t ir~ of thr labor pool from wh1rh TA derivr,.; its rmplo~·rr,;. Ibid. According!~· , ''thr <·videJJCl' aetna II~· pn',.;<'JJtPd I doP" not I on it~ facr ronHpicnonsly d!'mon,.;trat<· I thr I job rPqnir<'lllPIIi ·~ grosH]~· di,.;criminatory impart .''
Id , at a:H.

,,
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tended that persons receiving methadone should not
included within a class that is otherwise unobjectionable.
Their constitutional claim was that methadone users are
entitled to be treated like most other employees and applicants rather than like other users of narcotics. But the
District C'JOurt's findings unequivocally establish that there
are relevant differences between persons using methadone
regularly and persons who use no narcotics of any kind. ao
Respond~nts no longer question the need, or at least the
justification, for special rules for methadone users. Indeed,
they vigorously defend the District Court's opinion which
.expressly held that it would be permissible for TA to have a
special rule denying methadone users any employment unless
they had been undergoing treatment for at least a year, and
an.o ther special rule denying even the most senior and reliable
8<1 The Di ~trict Court found that methadone is a narcotic.
See 399 F.
Supp., at 1038. See al:>o id .. at 1044 · ("The evidence is that, during the
time patiPnt:> are being brought up to their constant dosage of methadone
(a period of about six weeki), there may be complaints of drowsiness,
insomma , PXCPss sweating, constipation, and perhaps some other symptoms.") . l\JorPovl'r, l'Very membl'r of the class of methadone users was
formerly addicted to the use of hProm. None is completely cured ; otherwise, thl're would be no contmuing need for treatment. All require some
measurP of ,:pecial superYi:;wn, and all must structure their weekly
routinP~ around mandator~· appearances at methadone clinics. The clinics
make periodic checks as long as the treatment continues in order to detect
evidl'nce of drug abuse. Employers must review, and sometimes verify,
these checks; since the record indicates that the information supplied by
treatment. centers i" not uniformally reliable, see n. 7, supra, the employer
has a special and continuing re:<pon:>ibilit~· to review the condition of these
person:>.
In addition , a ,;ubstantiul pereE-nta~te of per,;ons taking mrthadone will
Hot suc<·essfully eompletP the trratment program. The findings do not
ind1cat e with any preci~Jon the numher who drop out, or the number who
can fairly be claf!sifiPd a~ unemployable, but the evidencP indicates that it
may well be a majonty of tbo~ P taking mPthadone at an~· given time. Sre·
nn . 13 And 26, supra.

covered by
that rule; in
other words,
they should
not be
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methadone users any of the m.ore dangerous jobs in the
system.
The constitutional defect in TA's employment policies,
according to the District Court, is not that TA has special
rules for methadone users, but rather that some members of
tho class should havr been exempted from some requirements
of the special rules. Left intact by its holding are rules
requiring special supervision of methadone users to detect
evidence of drug abuse, and excluding them from high-risk
employment. Accepting those rules, the District Court nonetheless concluded that employment in nonsensitive jobs could
not be denied to methadone users who had progressed satisfactorily with their treatment for one year, and who, when
examined individually, satisfied TA's employment criteria.
In short, having r·ecognized that disparate treatment of methadone users simply because they are methadone users is
permissible- and having excused TA from an across-the-board
requirement of individual consideration of such persons-the
District Court COllstrued the Equal Protection Clause as
requiring T A to adopt additional and more precise special
rules for that special class.
But any special rule short of total exclusion that TA might
adopt is likely to be less precise than the one that it currently
enforces. If eligibility is marked at any intermediate pointwhether after one year of treatment or later-the classification will inevitably discriminate between employees or applicants equally or almost equally apt to achieve full recovery.n
Even the District Court's opinion did not rigidly specify one
year as a constitutionally mandated measure of the period of
treatment that guarantees full recovery from drug addictior1.~
2

.st It may W(•ll be, in fact, that many methadone users who lmve bef•n in
prugramH for ~omething le~s than a. year arr nctually more qualifiPd for
employment than many otlwr~ who have been in a program for longer
than a. ~vca r.
~ 2 "The TA i~ not prevented from making reasonable rul~ and rPgulation:; about mPthadonP maintahwd per~on~-~ueh aR requiring ~nti:;factory

..
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rrhe uncertainties associated with the rehabilitation of heroin
addicts precluded it from identifying any bright line marking
the point at which the risk of regression ends.'j 3 By contrast,
the "no drugs" policy now enforced by TA is supported by
the legitimate inference that as long as a treatment program
(or other drug use) continues. a degree of uncertainty persists.34 Accordingly, an employment policy that postpones
eligibility until the treatment program has been completed,
rather than accepting an iutermediate point on an uncertain
line, is rational. It is IH~ither unprincipled nor invidious in
the sense that it implies disrespect for the excluded subclass.
At its simplest. the Distt'ict Court's conclusion was that
TA's rule is broader than necessary to exclude those methadone users who are not actually qualified to work for TA.
We may assume not only that this conclusion is correct but also f
pf'rformauce in a program for n. period of time such as a year . . . ."
::399 F . Supp., at 1058.
3 a ThesE\ uucertaiutie~ arc evic!Pnt not only in the Di~trict Court '~ findings but abo in lt>gislative con~ideration of the problem. Sec M m·shall v.
United States, 414 U. S. 417 , ,125-427.
34
· The completiOn of thf' program also marks the point at which the
employee or applicant con::;idt>r::> himi:ielf cured of drug dependence. Moreover, it it~ the point a.t which the employee/applicant no longer must makr
regular viHitR to a met.hadoiw clinie, no longt>r has access to free methadone that might be hoarded and taken in exces:;ive and phyl:lically cliHruptive do::;PH, and at which a simple urine tel:lt-as opposed to a urine test
followed up by rft'orts to verify the bona fide::; of the subject'~ participation in a. methadone program, and of the program itself-suffices to prove
compliance with TA '~ rules.
Retipondents argue that the validity of these con~idera.tions is belied by
TA 's trentmt>nt of alcoholicl:l. Although TA rt>fuses to hire new employee~
with drinking problems, it continues in its t>mploy a large numbf'r of
per~on~ who have either been found drinking on the job or have been
depmecl unfit for dut~r becauHe of prior drinking. Thesf' situations give
risP to discipline but are handled on an individual basis. But the fact
that TA has thr l'f'~ourcrH to expend on onr elass of problem employt>es·
dors not by it~elf e:stablish a con~titutional duty on its part to come HI~
with re~ourcP~ to sp~'ncl on all elusses of problem employees.

·,

.
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that it is probably unwise for a large employer like TA to rely·
on a general rule instead of individualized consideration of
every job applicant. But these assumptions concern matters
of personnel policy that do not implicate the principle safeguarded by the Equal Protection Clause.a" As the District
Court recognized, the special classification created by TA 's
rule serves the general objectives of safety and efficiency.'ll'
Moreover, the exclusionary line challenged by respondents "is
not one which is directed 'against' any individual or category
of persons, but rather it represents a policy choice ... made
by that branch of Government vested with the power to make·
such choices.'' Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 428.
Because it does not circumscribe a class of persons characterized by some unpopular trait or affiliation, it does not create
or reflect any special likelihood of bias on the part of the·
ruling majority.a 7 Under these circumstances, it is of no ·
Tlw Di~trict Court al:-<o concludPd that TA's ru]p violatE'~ the Due·
Procf':;s Claus(• bccau~e it ('rf'atP:; !lll ''irrf'butabiP prP:;umption" of unemployability on the part of mrthadonf' u:;Prs. 399 F . Supp., at 1057. Rc- _/ \ ____:~pondPntt do . not rely ou the due procf'ss argument in thi:; Court, and·
~/
we find no merit 111 lt.
ao "I L jPgislativP c la~;-;ifications arf' valid unle"'" they bear 110 rational
relation"hip to tlw State's objectJve". Massachusetts Bd. of Retiremeut v.
Murgia. f427 U.S. 307,3141. State lf.>gi"lation ·dof.>s not violatf.> thr &tual
Protrction C lau:;e merely brcau::;f' the cla:;sifications I it makes] are imperfect.' Dandridge v. lflilliams, :397 lT. S. 471, 485.'' Washington v.
}"akirna Indian Nation. 11. S. - , (slip op., at 38). Se!' also·
Vance v. Bradley, U. S. - , - , quoting Phillips Chemical Co. v ..
Dumas &·hoot District, ;3(il tl. S. :376, :3H5. (''Even if the cla:;:;ification
involved hf'l'P lH to ;;onw f'Xtf'nt both under- and over·inclusive, and heucct lw !me drawn by Congre:-;:; imperfpct, it i:; tlf'Vf'rt hrle:;::; t hf' rule that in a .
<'H~(' likP thiH ' pprfcction i::; b~- no mean" requirrd. 'r..- - - - - - - - - - - . . . . 1
81 Smcr Barbier v. Cou nolly . 11:~ U. S. 27, the Court';; equal protPction
cai'IPH ha vr n •cogmzed a distinction lwtwrf'n ·' mvidiou:; discrimination ,'"
/If .. at :u-1. e.. rla:;sificatJoui-i drawn "with au evil PYP and an uuf'qual
hand" or motivatf'd by "a frrling of antipath~·" against, a ::;perific group
of n·:sid<>nt~. Vitk Wo \'. ll o]Jkins. llS F. S. :356, :373-374; Soon Hing v.
' Croll'l<'!!. 11:~ F . R. 7o:3, 710; i><'P also Quang IViny v. Kir-k endall, 223 U. S_
"5

l
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constitutional significance that the degree of rationality is not
as great with respect to certain ill-defined subparts of the
classification as it is with respect to the classification as a
whole. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83-84.aH
No matter how unwise it may be for TA to refuse employment to individual car cleaners, track repairmen, or bus
drivers simply because they are receiving methadone treatment, the Constitution does not authorize a Federal Court to
interfere in that policy decision. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals is
Reversed.

59-and thos(' ~pecial rul('~ that "a r(' often uec~~ary for general b('n('fitH
[::;uch as] supplying watrr, preventing fire~, lighting streets, opening parks,
and many other object::;." Barbier, supr·a, 113 U. S., at :n. See abo
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239-241. Quite plainly, TA 's Rule
11 (b) wa~ motivated by TA'::; intere:>t in operating a safe and efficient
transportation sy~tem rather than by any ~pecial animus against a opecifir
group of persons. Cf. 414 F. Supp., at 279. Respond('nts recognize thi~
valid gPneral motivation, a:> did the District Court, and for that rea::;on
ne1th('r challen e TA ';; rule a~ it applies to all narcotic user~, or Pven to
all methadonE' user::;. B('cau::;p re::;pondents merely challengE' thP rule in::;ofar a::; it applies to some methadone user~, that challenge does not even
rai~e the que::;tion whether thr rulP falls on th<> "invidiou~" Hide of the
Barbier distinction. Accordingly, there is nothing to give ri;;e to a pre~umption of illegality and to warrant our e::;pecially "attentive judgment."
Cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. :n2, :327.
118
" When a legal distinction is determined, as no on<> doubts then• may
be, between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a pomt has to be fixed or a line ha::; to b(' drawn, or gradually
p1cked out by succ('::;;;ive drci::;ions, to mark whrre the cha11ge takes place .
Looked at by it~elf without regard to the nrceo~ ity behind it the line or
pomt ~ee m::; arbitrary. It might a::; well or nearly a~ well be a little more
to one tiide or thP other. But when it 1~ ::;een that a line or point there
mu~t be, and that there 1~ uo mathematical or logical way of fixing it preri~ely, the decisiOn of the lrgi::;laturP mu~t be acceptrd unlrs~ wr can say
that it i:s very wid(' of any reasonable mark. " Louisville Gas Cv. v. Cole-.
man, 277 U . S. :32,41 (Holmr;;, J., di:s~enting).
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MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul
New · York - Transit · Authoritv v. Beazer, No. 77-1427
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist have joined

Justice Stevens' opinion, and I am sure you and the Chief are
with Justice Stevens in the result.

At this point, a Court to

reverse the Second Circuit seems certain.

The question is

whether you should write separately and reach the issue I feel
the case presents:

whether the TA also may refuse to employ

former narcotics users, including former methadone users.
Assuming that Justice Stevens would not be willing to
rewrite the opinion, I would recommend that you consider writinq

2.

separately.

Assuminq I am correct that the former user issue is

presented by this case, I think it is a bit unprofessional to
represent to the contrary.

More importantly, the opinion as it

currently reads leaves the clear impression that a ban on former
users would be unconstitutional.

This is a result the Conference

did not vote for and, I believe, is a matter that should not be
left to implication.

If the TA may not refuse to hire former

users consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, it should be
told so directly;

and if such a ban is constitutional, albeit

unwise, the TA should not be left with the opposite impression.
For the reasons we have discussed previously, I think a
ban on former users, at least to the extent it is somewhat
limited in time and is not a lifetime exclusion, does satisfy the
rational basis test.

I would be happy to draft a brief

concurring opinion indicating how the issue is presented in this
case and resolving it in favor of the TA.

The opinion could be

written as concurring in Justice Stevens' opinion while
supplementing it.

Such an opinion would have the benefit of

assuring the TA that it could continue its current policy without
any constitutional objections, whatever the wisdom of its
actions.

To: The Chief Justice
Mr · Justj_ce Brennan
Mr. Just:Lce Stewart
Mr · Justi. ce Marshall
Mr. Justice Bla c:kmun
vi1r. Ju8t5.ee Po well
Mr. Just ice R~hnquist
Mr. Justice Stevens

From: Mr. Justice White
Circulated:

1st DRAFT

Recirculated:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

l

No. 77- 1427

New York City Transit Authority On Writ of Certiorari to
et al., Petitioners,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the SecCarl A. Beazer et al.
ond Circuit.
[February --, 1979]

MR. J usTICE WHITE, dissenting.
Although the Court purports to apply settled principles
to unique facts, the result reached does not square with either
Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, but
respectfully, I dissent.
I
As an initial matter, the Court is unwise in failing to
remand the statutory claims to the Court of Appeals. The
District Court decided the Title VII issue only because it
provided a basis for allowing attorney's fees. 414 F. Supp.
277, 278 (SDNY 1976) . The Court of Appeals did not deal
with Title VII, relying instead on the intervening passage of
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976/ which
authorized the a ward of fees for success on the equal protection claim today held infirm by the Court. 558 F. 2d 97,
99-100 (CA2 1977). In such circumstances, and finding that
we disagree with the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the
constitutional question, we would usually remand the unexplored alternative basis for relief. E. g., Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. l\'RDC, 435 U. S. 519, 549 (1978).
That course would obviate the need for us to deal with what
the Co urt considers to be a factual issue or at least would provide assistance iu analyzing the issue.
1 42 !1 , 8. ( ' §WRI-.,

..
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Because the Court has decided the question. however, I
must express my reservations about the merits of that decision.
In a disparate impact hiring case such as this. the plaintiff
must show that the challenged practice excludes members of
a protected group in numbers disproportionate to their incidence in the pool of potential employees. 2 Respondents made
out a sufficient. though not strong, prima. facie case by proving
that about 63% of those using methadone in the New York
City area are black or Hispanic ~ and that only about 20%
of the population as a whole belongs to one of those groups.
I think it fair to conclude. as the District must have, that
blacks and Hispanics suffer three times as much from the
operation of the challenged rule excluding methadone users
as one would expect from a neutral practice. Thus, excluding
those who are or have been in methadone programs "oper.a te[s] to render ineligible a markedly disproportionate number" of blacks and Hispanics-. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424,429 (1971).
In response to this, the Court says only that the 63%
statistic was not limited to those who worked for or sought
to work for petitioners and to those·who have been successfully
maintained on methadone. Ante, at 15-16. I suggest, in the
first place, that these attacks on facially valid statistics should
See ante, at 14 ; Dothard v. Ra'Wlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 329 (1977).
The failure to hire is not "because of" race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin if the advrrse relationship of the ch·anenged practice to one of those
factors is purely a mattrr of chance-a statistical coincidence. See Griggs,
supra, at 430 ; Civil Rights Art of 19M, § 703 (a), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e--2
(a) . Bryond the statistically Hignificant relationship between rncr and
participation in methadone programs shown by the figures lwre, r<"spondent s introduced direct evidence thal the high frequency of minorities
nmong the di~qualifiecl group was not ju~t a chance aberration. See n. 11,
2

i nfra.
The rvidencP beforr 1he Di~trir1 Conrt established that 80% of heroin
in the New York City metropoli1an area, the source of clien1s for
tl;l~~':lc m~·l hadorH' rlinirs. are black or lli~lmnic.
3

addict~
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have been made in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 331 (1977);
the first contention was not even made in this Court. It also
seems to me that petitioners have little to complain about
insofar as thP makeup of the applicant pool is concerned siHce
they refused ou grounds of irrelevancy to allow discovery of
the racial background of the applicants denied employment
pursuant to the methadone rule.
In any event, I cannot agree with the Court's assertions
that this evidence "reveals little if anything," "tells us
nothing. " ami is "virtually irrelevant." Ante, at 14-15.
There is not a shadow of doubt that methadone users do apply
for employment with petitioner. and because 63% of all methadone users are black or Hispanc, there is every reason to conclude that a majority of methadone users who apply are also
from these minority groups. Almost 5% of all applicants are
rejected due to the rule, and undoubtedly many black and
Hispanic are among those rejected. Why would proportionally fewer of them than whites secure work with petitioner
absent the challenged practice? The Court gives no reason
whatsoever for re:iecting this se11sible inference. and where
the inference depends so much on local knowledge. I would
accept the judgment of the District Court rather than purport
to make an independent juclgrnent from the banks of the
Potomac. At the very least. as I have said, 1 would seek the
views of the Court of Appeals.
The Court complains that even if minority groups make
up 63 ?{ of methadone-user applicants, this statistic is an
insufficient indicator of the compositon of the group found
by the District Court to have been wrongly excluded-that
is, those who have been successfully maintained for a year or
more. I cannot. however. presume with the Court that blacks
or Hispamcs wlll be less likely than whites to succeed on
methadone. I would have thought. uutil rebutted. the presumption would bP onP of an equal chance of success, and
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there has been no rebuttaL '''ith all due respect, I would
accept the statistics as making a prima facie case of disparate
impact. Obviously, the case could have been stronger, but
this Court is unjustified in displacing the District Court's
acceptance of uncontradicted, relevant evidence.

II
I also disagree with the Court's disposition of the Equal
Protection claim in light of the facts established below. The
District Court found that the evidence conclusively established
that petitioners exclude from employment all persons who are
successfully on methadone mai11tenance-that is, those who
after one year are "free of the use of heroin, other illicit
drugs, and problem drinking." 399 F. Supp., at 1047-and
those who have graduated from methadone programs and
remain drug-free for less than five years; 1 that past or present
4

Because

tllP ruiP is nuwritten iu rPlrvant part. thPre is confusion about
Thr Court a~~rrt,; that it does not exclude those who formerly
u"ed methadone, nnd that the Di~trict Court " did not settle the question of
what pohcy TA rnforce" in thi:; n·spect . ..." Ante, at 3 n. 3. In fact,
however, petitioner:; open!~· admit that they automatically exclude former
methndone u~Prs unit"Hii the~· "haw been eompletely drug frpe and have had
a staulr history for at least five years." Brief for J>etitioner:; 5. And I
quote the District Court's act11al finding which in context is unlike that
described by the majority :

it~ ~cope.

"It is clear that a relatiwl~r recent methadone user would be subject to the
blanket exclusionary polic~-. However, t11e TA ha~ indicated that there
might be some fiexibility with respect to a per~on who had once u~ed
m<·thadom', but had been free of such use for a period of five year~ or
more " 399 F. Supp. 1082, 103(i (SDNY 1975) .
The Court find~ no '' conerete dispute between adverse litigants" over
thP former n:,;er~ policy berausf' no former nser b entitled to relief under
tlw Di~tnct Court ':,; injunction . Ante, at 3 n. 3. But rP,;po11deu1 Frazier
i:< a fornwr u"er, seP ic!., ai 7 n . t! , and the Di::;tric1 Court cxpre::;slr grantPd
hitn rehd, including lntckpa~- from the tune he was rrjecter! a~ a recent
former mE'thadmw wwr. App. to Pet. for Cert. 77a-78a . The Court
,tpparmtly read~ I be Di~1 rict Court 's mjunctwn aA protecting on]~- those
ver. on~ who had hc·cn in methadone pmgram:; for n year or Junger befon:
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successful mf'thadone mainteuan'ce is not a meaningful predictor of poor performance or conduct in most job categories;
that petitioners could use their normal employee-screening
mechanisms to separate the successfully maintained users
from the unsuccessful; and that pf'titioners do exactly that for
other groups that common sense indicates might also be suspect employees.~ Petitioners did not challe11ge these factual
conclusions in the Court of Appeals, but that court nonetheless rev~wed the evidence and found that it overwhelmingly
support~he District Court's fiudings. 557 F. 2d, at 99. It
bears repeating, then, that both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals found that those who have been maintained
on methadone for a least a year and who are free from the use
of illicit drugs and alcohol can easily be identified through
normal personal procedures and, for a great many jobs, are as
they WPl'<' run·d. It i~ inered1biP that tlw Di:strict Court would have
able to triumph ovrr hProin addictiOn iu lr,.;,.; than
u year. And the context of tlw Di:strict Court'~ ordrr, rombinrcl with the
grant of rrh<'f to re~ponclrnt Fra::;irr, mak~ it rlrar that the court intendPd
lo prot<'ct, and had good rra~on to do :;o, all fornwr methadone u:srr,.; ns
well a~ tho~e eurn•nt w<<'r;,; who have b('(•n ~ucce~:;fully maintamed for more
than a yPai . ( Whrre 111 tlu,.; di~sPnt l rdrr to "~uree:-<sful methadone
lJ<>rr~ · 1 m<•an all tho~P in tlw da,:; pi·ote<·ted by the Di~trict Court, indudmg fornwr u:;er" )
r, l{p,.;pondl'nl~ pre~ented nunwrous top rxp<•rt~ in thi~ field and large
('!lliJioyrr~ Pxperienced w1t h former lwrom usrrs t reatPd with met hadonr.
Hoth ~1d!'~ rp~t ed aftrr SIX da~·,.; of trw!, but the Di::>t net Court demanded
ninP mor<' da~·~ of furthPr factual dev<'lopmrnt, and an eight-hour in~pec
tiOn of pPiitioner~ ' facilitieR, lJrCall~<' it did uol h<•licvP that the rvidcncr
eould br ::;o one-sidrdly m respondents' favor. The court corrrctly rralized
it~ re::<pon::<Jblhty iu a puhlie law caRP of this trpe to demand thr wholr
stor~ · lwforP makmg a con,.;htuhonal rulmg. Srr Chaye~, Thr Hole of tlw
Jud!-(r in Puhhe Law LitigatiOn, H!) Harv. L. Hrv. 1281 (1976). Tlw
DJ:;tnC't Court ealle(l ~1x w1tm·:;~r,.; of Jt,.; own, and 1t cho:;r tlwm primarily
IJt'cau:;P thr~· had wrntrn art!Cl!'" on methadon<' mmntenaner that p<'fition('1'" as~rrtl'd had :;how11 tlw tmrehabihty of that mPthod of cl!'almg w1th
herom addl('t!On It abo corrrctly expr<'~:-;('(l it" rrfui:ial to bn:;r "tt<'h ~~
jf1dgnwut on ~lnftmp; mrch<"al <Opm1ono,
pum~lwd tho~P p<•r::;on~
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employable and present no more risk than applicants from
the general population.
Though petitioners' argument here is primarily an attack
upon the factfinding below, the Court does not directly accept
that thesis. Instead, it concludes that the District Court and
the Court of Appeals both misapplied the Equal Protection
Clause. On the fa.cts as found, however, one can reach the
Court's result only if that Clause imposes no real constraint
at all in this situation.
The question before us is the rationality of placing successfully maintained or recently cured persons in the same category as those just attempting to escape heroin addiction or
who have failed to escape it instead of in with the general
population. 6 The asserted justification for the challenged
cl!fssification is the objective of a capable and reliable work
force , and thus the characteristic in question is employability.
"Employability," in this regard, does not mean that any particular applicant, much less every member of a given group
of applicants, will turn out to be a model worker. Nor does
it mean that no such applicant will ever become or be discovered to be a malingerer, thief, alcoholic, or even heroin
addict. All employers take such risks. Employability, as the
District Court used it in reference to successfully maintained
methadone users, means only that the employer is no more
likely to find a member of that group to be an unsatisfactory
employee than he would an employee chosen from the general
population .
Petitioners had every opportunity, but presented nothing to
negative the employability of successfully maintained methadone users as distinguished from those who were unsuccessful.
"The rulr ';:; trf•atment of thu~e who succred iH at is~ue here, since the
Distnct Court effectivd:1· amended the complaint to allege di;:;criminatiun
agamst that Hubgroup, st'e Fed. Hule Civ. Proc . 15 (b) , and implicitly
found .no eou~tituhon:d violatiou with n'~pert to others burclenrd by the

prae1ii'P.
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Instead, petitioners, like the Court, dwell on the methadone
failures-those who quit the programs or who remain but
turn to illicit drug use. The Court, for instance, makes much
of the drug use of many of those in methadone programs,
including those who have been in such programs for more
than one year. Ante, at 6. But this has little force since
those persons are not "successful," can be and have been identified as such, see id., at 5. 7 and are not within the protection
of the District Court's injunction. That 20 to 30%, are unsuccessful after one year in a methadone program tells us nothing
about the employability of the successful group, and it is the
latter category of applicants that the District Court and the
Court of Appeals held to be unconstitutionally burdened by
the blanket rule disqualifying them from employment.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals were therefore
fully justified in finding that petitioners could not reasonably
have concluded that the protected group is less employable
than the general population and that excluding it "has no
rational relation to the demands of the jobs to be performed. " 8 399 F. Supp., at 1057. In fact, the Court assumes
that petitioners' policy is unnecessarily broad in excluding the
successfully maintained and the recently cured, id., at 19, and
that a member of that group can be selected with adequate
preCisiOn. l d., at 5. Despite this, the validity of the exclusion is upheld ou the rational basis of the uninvolved portion
7

The t->vidence indieate>s that Jloor risks will shah out of a mPthadonemaintcnanc(· program within ::;ix months . 399 F. Supp .. a,t 1048. It is a
mewmre of thP Di~trict Court's caution that it Het a one-year standard.
8 A major sponsor of the recent amendmruts to the Hehabilitation Act,
i:>Pe ante, at 10-11, and n. Hi, described the> congres1:1ional dete>rmination
behind thPm H8 being thai a public employer "cannot as::;urne that a history
of alcoholi;;m or drug addiction, includmg a pa::;i addiction currPntly treated
by mrthadone maintpnance, pose's suffic1rnt danger in and of it;;elf to
justify exclu~ion I from employment 1. Such an m;::;umption would have
no basi:-; in fact
"' 124 Cong. Rrr. S19002 (Sen. William;;) (dail.y ('d.
Oct , 14, l97!-),

,'
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of the rule, that is, that the rule excludes many who are less
employable. But petitioners must justify the distinction between groups, not j]Jst the policy to which they have attached
the classification. The purpose of the rule as a whole is
relevant only if th~ classification within the rule serves the
purpose, but the majority's assumption admits that is not so.
Justification of the blanket exclusion is not furthered by
the statement that "any special rule short of total exclusion .. . is likely to be less precise than the one that [petitioners] currently enforce [ ] ." I d., at 18. If the rule were narrowed as the District Court ordered, it would operate more
precisely in at least one respect. for many employable persons
would no longer be excluded. Nor does the current rule provide a "bright line," for there is nothing magic about the
point five years after treatment has ended. There is a risk of
"regression'' among those who have never used methadone,
and the Court cannot overcome the District Court's finding
that a readily ascertainable point exists at which the risk has
so decreased that the maintained or recently cured person is
generally as employable as auyone else."
Of course. the District Court's order permitting total ex~
elusion of all methadone users maintained for less than one
year, whether successfully or 11ot, would still exclude some
employables and would to this extent be overinclusive. "Overinclusiveness" as to the primary objective of employability
is accepted for Jess successful methadone users because it ful~
fills a secondary purpose and thus is not "overinclusive" at
all. See Vance v. Bradley, U. S. --, (1979). Although many of those who have not been successfully main~
tained for a year are employable. as a class they, milike the
" Though a prr~un frre of illiCJt drug usr fur one ~· ear might ~ubse
quently n'v('rt. thol:ie who have graduated from methadone program:; might
do :<o al~o, and the Court apparently believe<i that the employment <>xclu~ JOn roHid not ro nHt Jtutionally be extencied to them. Se<> aute. at :3 n. ;j,
;md 19 n ;{4 ,

'0
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~protected

group, are not as employable as the general popula~
tion. Thus, even assuming the bad risks could be identified,
serving the end of employability would require unusual efforts
to determine those more likely to revert. But that legitimate
secondary goal is not fulfilleJ by-exCluding the protected class:
The District Court found that the fact of successful participa~
tion for one year could be discovered through petitioners' nor~
mal screening process without additional effo'rt and, I repeat,
that those who meet that criterion are no more-likely ' than the
average applicant to turn out to be a poor employee. to Ac~
cordingly, the rule's classification of successfully maintained
persons as dispositively different from the general population
is left without any justification and, with its irrationality and
invidiousness thus uncovered, must fail before the Equal Pro~
tection Clause. n

1 " Siner thr Di~trict Court foun·d a~ a ' fnct, and the Court doe~ not deny,
that the bad ri~kH could be culled from thi~ group through the normal
proc<•s,;ing or employment applications, tlw onl~· po~siblr justificntion for
tbi~ rule iH that it rliminatE't> application~ .in which petitioners would
inve;;t :some time and effort before finding the perHon unemployable. tho
problem, howf•ver, i~ that not everyone in the general population is employable . Thu~, if vacancie~ are to be filled, individualized hiring deci:sion~
must br made• in any event .
The fact of nwthadonr u:;e must br determined somehow, so all applicat wn::; mu:st at lea::;t be rrad, aud petitioners requirr all applicants under :35
to ::;ubrnit lo urinalysi,.; . Heading the application:; may disclo~r not only
the fact of methadone m;e but abo whrther the pPrs::m has certain eduratwnal or other qualification~ and whethrr he or she has had a ~table
employment t>xperiPnce or any recent job-rt>lated difficultie~.
u I have difficulty aiHo with the Court'~ ea::;y conclusion that the chal]Pnged rule was " [qJuitt- plainly" not motivated ''by any special animus."
Ante. at 20-21, n. 37. Ht>roin nddirtion io; a special problem of the poor,
and thP addict population IS cornpo~ed largely of racial rninoritie:s that the
Court ha:s previou~ly recogmzcd a::; politically powerless and historically
subjects of majoritanan neglect. Person:; on methadone maintenancr have
few mtere~tH in common with member:; of thr majority. and 11m~ arr
tmlikely to have their intere:,;t~ protected, or rvrn con::;idered, in governmental dCCIHIOllmaking-. Indeed, petitioner~ ~tipulated that "I ojne of the

•'

·.
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Finally, even were the District Court wrong, and successfully maintained perso11s margillally less employable than the
rea~ous for the ... drug policy i~ the fact that l' petitiOIJPr~J feelL] an
adverse public reaction would re~ult if it were generally known that Lpetitiorwr~ I employed prr::;un::i with a prior history of drug abu:sr, including
pero>Ollti participatiug in methadone maintenance program;;." App. 83A.
It iH hard fur me to reconcilr that stipulation of animus againHt former
addict,; with our pa;;t holding::; that "a bare ... desirr to harm a politically
uupopular group cannot constitute a legitimatr governmental interrst ."
U.S. Dept of Agriculture \'. Mor·eno. 41:3 U.S. 528, 534 (197:3). On thr
otbrr hand, t hr affliction::; to which prtitionrrH arr more ~ympathetic, such
a;; aleoholl!Sm and mrntal ilht<'HH, arr ;;bared by both white and black, rich
and poor.
Somr wright ::;hould also he givPll to the hi;;tory of thr rulr. Sl'<' Village
of Arliii(Jtoll Heights v. Metrupulitau Housing Dev. Corp., 429 ll. S. 25:2,
267-2()1.; ( 1977). Prtitionpr::; admit that it was not thr re::;ult of a rra::;oned
policy decision and stipulatrd that they had never studied tlw ability of
those ou methadone maint rnanc(• to perform pet itionero;' jobs. Petitioner~
arc not dirPctl~- aceountablr to t hr public, an• not thr type of officml bod~
tltqt normally make,; legJ::ilativr judgment~ of fact such a~ thosr relied
upon by the majority today, and are by natun• morP concPmPd with
bu::;ine~H efficirnc~· than with other public policies for which thry have no
d1rect rc~pon:::;ibilit~·. Cf. Harnpto11 \'. Mote Sun Wong, 42(i 11. S. 88, 103
(19ifi). But srl' ante. at 20. Both tlw Statr ;md City of Nrw York,
which do rxhibit thosr democratic eharach•riRttr~, birr per:;om; in methadone program ~ for ~imilar job~.
The~r fact or~ logrt her ~trongl~· point to a concluo;ion of iHvJdiou::> di:;criminatwn. The Comt, howrvPr , rpfuo>es to vi<'w !hi:; rulr as one ''circumt>eribf ing] a eta:;;; of prrHon~ characterizrd by somP unpopular trait or
affiliation •· hecausP 1t 1:::; admitted!~· ju~tifird as applied to many currrnt
aucl former herom acldJct::;. Becau::ic tl1P challrngrcl cla,;o;ifieation unfairly
burdens ouly a o;mall portion of all heroin addJCto>, thr Court rt>a~on;; that
it cannot possibly havP brrn H]Htrrecl by animu~ by tlw "ruling majority."
Ali that show,;, howpvrr, i:s that thr charactPri~tic in ljurstion i~ a legitimatr lm~iH of dio;tinction in o;omP eirctun:;tanCPH; lwrom addtction i~ a :;eriou:s afHJctiun that will oftrn affrct Pmpluyabilit~·. But ~ometimr,; antipathy
exten(b bryoncl tlw facts that may have givru fl~<' to it. and when that
happrnH thP ''o;tprrotyprd J'<•achon nm~ - havr 110 rational rrlation~hip
ut hPr than JHlrP prPjuclirud di~crimmation-to tht> statrd purpose for which
fhe cla::;s!fiealion i~ hemg mad!' ." Mathews \'.Lucas, -!27 LT. 8. 495, 520-
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-a verage applicant, 12 the blanket exclusion of only these people.
when but a few are actually unemployable and when many
other groups have varying numbers of unemployable members, is arbitrary and uncOIJstitutiona1. Many persons now
suffer from or may again suffer from some handicap related
to employability. 1 R But petitioners have singled out respondents-unlike exoffenders. former alcoholics and mental
patients, diabetics, epileptics. and those currMtly using tranquilizers. for example-for sacrifice to this at best ethereal
and likely 11onexistent risk of increased unemployability.
uch an arbitrary assignment of burdens among classes that
are similarly situated with respect to the proferred objectives
is the type of iuvidious choice forbidden ·by t!Ye Equal Protection Clause.11
5:21 {1977) (rh~:;rntmg opinion) (footnote omittrd). That is the cn':-ie
here .
12 Th(' Distriet Court found that ihr orily common phy:-;ical pffrct~ ol
methadon<-' maintenance are incrrns<'8 in swratiug, iu:;omnia, and COIIH1ipntwn, and a clrrrra~e in ~rx clrivl'. 399 F. Supp., nt 1044-1045. 1'ho:<<'
di~abihtir::; are unfortunate but ar<· hardly relatrd to inabilit~· to br a :stibway janitor. This Court hint::; that tht> rmplo~·ability of evt>n tho~E' surCE'H~full~· bt>tng maiutaint>d on mPthadone might be rE>clucrd by thE'ir obligation to appear at thE'ir climes thrre ttme:s a week. Ante. at 17 11. :lO. But
all employe<'" have out~idr obligation:;, and petitioner~ have 1wither are;urd
nor proven that th1::~ par!Jcular dut~· would mtt>rfrre with work.
The D1strict Court d1d find that a po:;sible but rare effect of mrthadoJH'
i~ minor impairment of abilitw~ "requirrd for i he performance of potentially hazardou~ ta~k:;, :;uch a~ driving a car or opemting machinery," 890
F. Supp., at 1045, and the court exemptPd from the relief orderrd Huch
positiou~ a:s ~ubway motorman. which require "unique ;,;en:sit ivity." ld.,
at 1052. Bnt thi:; doe~ not make rational the blanket exrlu:;iou from employment, rPgardless of tlw qualifications "<'qmred.
laThe Di~tnct Court found, and petitioner~ have not challenged. that
currrnt prolJlem drmker:; prr~eut morE' of an employment nsk than do
rt>spondrnt:s. PetJtJoJwr;:; do not automat1eally cli:-;rharge rmplo~· ee;; who
arp found to haw a drinkmg ]>rohlPm.
1• Tlw Court argue:; that •'tlw fart that [pC'tttioner.- have] the re;:;ourrr:<
:ro exJH•nd on on<· ria~" of problem Pntployr<'li dors not by 1t"elf eRtahlish 11
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con~titutional duty on [thPirl part to come up with resource~ to :;pend
on all rlasses of problem employee::;.'' Ante, at 19 n. 34. If respondents
wrre demanding to have the benefit of a rehabilitation program extended
to them, petitioners could perhaJlS argue for frerdom to deal with only
onP problem at a timr due to limited resources. See Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 41:-\9 (1955). In that situation. ihe lack of
resources. or the desire to experimrnt in 11 limitrd field, might be a legitimate objectiYe explaining the rla~::;ifiration. But respondPnts are not askmg for ::;peeial, beneficial treatment; they are n~king why they should br
nl)solutrly excluded froln the opportunity to compete for petitioners' jobs.
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The Transit Authority (TA) operates the subway system
and certain bus lines in New York City. It employs about
47,000 persons, of whom many-perhaps most--are employed
in positions that iuvolve danger to themselves or to the public.
For example, some 12,300 are subway motormen, towermen,
conductors, or bus operators. The District Court found that
these jobs are attended by unusual hazards and must be performed by "persons of maximum alertness and competence.''
399 F. Supp. 1033, 1052. Certain other jobs. such as operating cranes and handling high voltage equipment, are als.o
consider0d "critical," or "safety sensitive." while still others,
though classified as "non-critical," have a potentially impo~;·
tant impact on the overall operation of the transportation
system.2
TA e11forces a general policy against employing persons
who use narcotic drugs. The policy is reflected in Rule 11 (b)
of TA's Rules and Regulations.
''Employees must not use, or have in their possession,
narcotics. tranquilizers. drugs of the Amphetamine group
or barbiturate dNivatives or paraphernalia used to admunster narcotics ot· barbiturate derivatives, except with
Lhe writte11 permission of the Medical Director-Chief
Surgeon of the System. ??
Methadone is regarded as a narcotic within the meaning of
Rule 11 (b). No written prrmission has ever been given by
TA's Medical Director for the employment of a person using
methadoue,l<
far Kanctwned such n departure hy a lower court, as to call for an exer~
cb<> of th1s court·~ ,.;upervi8wn."
2 Tim~, about 13,400 !'mplo~w·~ are involvl•d in t hr maintrnance of
::;uuway cars, bU8<'~. tr:wk, tunnrl~, and structurrs. Anoth€'r 5,600 work in
subway Htatwns, and ovrr 2,000 nrc !;'ngaged in offirr ta~ks that include
the handling of large ~;ums of money TA hires about 3,000 new employees
eaeh year
3 By 1t~ !!'rm~, Hule 11 (h) doeH not apply to p!'r~ons who formerly
~113ed mrthadon1• or. any otlwr drug, und the Di;.;trict Court did. not find:
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The District Court found that methadone is a synthetic
narcotic and a central nervous system depressant. If injected
into the blood stream with a needle, it produces essentially
the same effects as heroin! Methadone has been used legitithat TA had any general policy covering former u~;ers. On the contrary,
the court found that "[fJhe situation is not entirely clear with respect to
the policy of the TA regarding personi:l who have successfully concluded
participation in a methadone program." 399 F. Supp., at 1036.
Although it did not settle the question of what policy TA enforces in
thb rP,;pect, the District Court mcluded former users in the plaintiff
ela;;s. It then afforded them rehef from any blanket exclusionary policy
that TA might enforce, although, agnin, the supporting factual findings
were admittedly "not [based on] a great deal" of evidence. Ja., at 1051.
TA contends that the meager Pvidenee rece1ved at trial on tlw "former
users" 1ssue was insufficient to support either the class or relief deterrninatlonll made w1th respeet to tho;;e persons. We go further. As far as we
a1·e aware there was no evidenr·e offered at trial, and certainly none relied
upon by tlw D1stnct Court, t11at TA actually refused employment to any
former u:>er rntitl<>d to relief under the injunction ordered by that court.
( It ~~ not clPar tlmt the on<> named plaintiff who was a form<>r user when
the ('omplamt was filPd was a former user at the time lw applied for a
job with TA, in any cnse, he had not completrd a full year of mrthadone
maintmancr and could thereforP lw exeluded under the Di~:;trict Court's
injunction . Sre post, at n . 12.)
It follows that neither the finding~ of fact, nor the record evidence,
' quarely presents any issue with respect to former users that must be
resolved in order to dispose of tlus litigation. A policy excluding all
former users would be harder to .JUstify than a policy applicable only to
persons currently receiving treatment. A comt ~:;hould not reach out to
express an opinion on the constitutiOnality of such a policy unless necessary
to adjud1cate a roncrete dispnte between adver:;p litigants. We shall therefore confine our consideration to the legality of TA's enforcement of its
Rule 11 (b) against cwTeu t users of met had one.
4 "Herom i~ a narcotic which is' genPrally mjected into the bloodl:ltream
by a nePdle. It I~> a central nervous system depressant. The usual effect
i" to crPntP a 'h1gh '-euphoria, drowsiness-for about thirty minut!:'i:l, which
then tapers off over a penod of about thre<> or four hourH. At the end of
this tune the heroin user experience;; oncknes~; and discomfort known as
withdrawal ::;ymptoms.' Then· i:; unense craving for another o;hot of
heroin, aft('r whJCh the cycle start:; over agam. A typiral addict will inject
heroin several tmws a dav '' ;~99 F Supp , at 10:38

l
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mately ln at least three ways-as a pain killer, in "detoxification units" of hospitals as an immediate means of taking
addicts off of heroin," and in long range "methadone maintenance programs" as pa.rt of a permanent cure for heroin
addiction. See 21 CFR § 310.304 (b) (1978). In such programs the methadone is taken orally in regula.r doses for a
prolonged period. As so administered, it does not produce
euphoria or any pleasurable effects associated with heroin; on
the contrary, it prevents users from experiencing those effects
when they i1iject heroin, and also alleviates the severe and
prolonged discomfort otherwise associated with an addict's
disco11tinuance of the use of heroin.
About 40,000 persons receive methadone maintenance treatment in New York City, of whom about 26.000 participate
in the five major public or semi-public programs,n and 14,000
o The Dbtrict Court found thnt detoxification is accompli~hed "by
switching a heroin addict to methadone and gradually reducing the doses
of methadone to zero over a period of about thret> weeks. The patient
thns dctoxifi<>d is dmg frt>e. Moreover, it is hoped' that the program of
gradnally reduced dose::; of methadone leaves him without the withdrawaT
symptons, or tlw 'phyHical dependence' on a narcotic.'• 399 F. Supp., at

1038.
6 "The five major public or sem1-public methadone· maintenance pro-·
grams in New York City are :
" (1) Beth Israel program . .. with 33 clinics treati'ng 7100 patients;
" (2) A program administered by tlie City of New York with 39 clinics•
' treating 12,400 patients (hereafter referred' to as 'tlie City program');

" (3) A progrnm administered by the Bronx State Hospital and the Albert
Ein~tein College of Medicine, with 7 clinics trt>ating about 2400 patients;
" (4) A program operated by the Addiction Research and Treatment Center (ARTC) with 6 clinics trt>atmg about 1200 patients; and
'

" (5) A program operated by the New York State Drug Abuse Control
Commission (DACC) , with 8 climcl:' trt>ating about 1100 patients.
"The total number of pat1ent~ treated in public or Ht>mi-public programs•
ls about 26,000. It appears that these programs are financed almos..t:
entirely by ft>deral, .state and city funds." 399 F. Supp., at 104Q.

•,

1
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are involved in about 25 private programs. 7 The sole purpose
of all these programs is to cure the addiction of persons who
have been using heroin for at least two years.
Methadone maintenance treatment in New York is largely
governed by regulations promulgated by the New York Drug
Abuse Control Commission. Under the regulations, the newly
accepted addict must first be detoxified, normally in a hospital.
A controlled daily dosage of methadone is then prescribed.
The regulations require tha.t six doses a week be administered
at a clinic, while the seventh day's dose may be taken at
home. If progress is satisfactory for three months, additional
doses may be taken away from the clinic, although through~
out most of the program. which often lasts for several years,
there is a minimum requirement of three clinic appearances a
week. During these visits, the patient not only receives his
doses but is also counseled and tested for illicit use of drugs. 8
The evidence indicates that methadone is an effective cure
"[V]ery little specific information was provided [at trial] r~garding
the private clinics." 399 F. Supp., at 1046. What evidence there was
indicated that tho~e clinic~ were likely to be less successful and less able
to provide accurate mformation about their clients than the public clinics.
Id., at 1046, 1050.
8 Although the Unit1:>d State8 Food and Drug Administration has also
issued regulations in this area, 21 CFR §§ 291.501, 291.505 (1978), the
New York State regulations are a:; or more stringent and thus effectively
set the relevant standards for the authorized methadone maintenance programs mvolved in this case. Under those regulations, in-clini~ ingestion
of methadone must be observed by staff members, NYCRR § 2021.13 (b),
and must occur with a frequency of six days a week during the first three
months, no less than three days a week thereafter through the second year
of trPatment, and two days a week thereafter. !d., §2021.13(a)(l).
Tests art' required to prevent hoardmg of take-home dose~, exce:;sive use
of nwthadone, and illicit use of other drugs or alcohol, any of which, if
found, can result in mcreased cJmic-VISit frequency OJ' in termination from
the program. !d., §§2021.13 (c)(2), 20'21.13 (g). The programs are also
required to include ''a comprehensive range of rehabilitative service::; on-site
under profe~s10nal supervisiOn," id, § 2021.13 (3), although participation
in many of theo;e 8etvich; is volnntarv and irrpgular.
7

-

'
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for the physical aspects of heroin addiction. But the District
Court also found "that many persons attempting to overcome·
heroin addiction have psychological or lifestyle problems
which reach beyond what can be cured by the physical taking
of doses of methadone." 399 F. Supp., at 1039. The crucial
indicator of successful methadone maintenance is the patient's
abstinence from the illegal or excessive use of drugs and
alcohol. The District Court found that the risk of reversion
to drug or alcohol abuse declines dramatically after the first
few months of treatment. Indeed, "the strong majority" of
patients who have been on methadone maintenance for at
least a year are free from illicit drug use. 9 But a significant
number are not. On this critical point, the evidence relied
upon by the District Court reveals that even among participants with more than 12 months' tenure in methadone maintenance programs, the incidence of drug and alcohol abuse
may often approach and even exceed 25%?11
This litigation was brought ·by the four respondents as a
class action on behalf of all persons who have been, or would
in the future be, subject to discharge or rejection as employees
of TA by reason of participation in a methadone maintenance
program. Two of the respondents are former employees of
"I conclude from all the evidence that the strong majority of methadone maintained persons are successful, at least after the initial period of
adjustment, in keeping themselve:s free of the use of heroin, other illicit
drugs, and problem dririkmg." 6'99 F . Supp., at 1047.
10 Thus, for example :
"Dr. Tngg of Beth Israel testified that about 5,000 out of the 6,500-7,000
patients in his clinics have been on methadone maintenance for a year or
more. He further testified that 75% of this 5,000 are free from illicit drug
·use " 399 F . Supp., at 1046.
Similarly, although the figure:; may be somewhat higher for the City and
Bronx State Hospital programs, only 70% of the ARTQ patients w1th a
vear '~ tenure or more were found to be free from illicit drug or alcohol
use It is rea:;ona.ble to infer from this E'vidence that anywhere from 20
to 30% of those who have been on maintenance for over .a year have
·drug or alcohol prohletm•"
9

..... ,

'.
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TA who were dismissed while they were receiving methadone
treatment. 11 The other two were refused employment by TA,
one both shortly before and shortly after the successful conclusion of his methadone treatment, 12 and the other while he
was taking methadone. 1 ' Their complaint alleged that TA's
blanket exclusion of all former heroin addicts receiving methadone treatment was illegal under the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000 et seq., and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The trial record contains extensive evidence concerning the
success of methadone maintenance programs, the employability of persons taking methadone, and the ability of prospective employers to detect drug abuse or other undesirable
characteristics of methadone users. In general, the District
Court concluded that there are substantial numbers of meth11 Re~pondent Beazer was dismissed in November 1971 when his heroin
addiction became known to TA and shortly after he enrolled in a methadone maintenance program; he succe~:~~;fully terminated his treatment in
November 1973. Rei:>pondent Reye~ began his methadone treatment in
1971 and was dismissed by TA in 1972. At the time of trial, in 1975, he
was still participating in a methadone program.
12 Respondent Frasier was on methadone maintenance for only five
months, from October 1972 until March 1973. TA refused to employ him
as a but:~ operator in March 1973 and as a bus cleaner in April 1973.
Fl"'asier did not participate in a methadone program for even half a year.
Moreover, he t,ested positively for methadone us<> at the time of his March
application and only a few weeki:> before his April application was rejected
under Rule 11 (b) . See 399 F . Supp., at HKH ; App ., at 32A. Under
these circumstances, the District Court's characterization of Frazier as a
' former '' u:ser at the time he applied, and its inclusion of Frazier in the
group of "tenured " methadone users for whom it felt relief was appropriate under the Equal Protection Clause, see n. 32, infra, are without
apparent Justification
13 Respondent D~az entered a methadone maintenance program in
December 1968 :md was still receiving treatment at the time of trial. He
was refuRed employment as a mttintenance helper in 1970"
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adone users who are just as employable as other members of
the general population and that normal personnel screening
procedures-at least if augmented by some method of obtaining information from the staffs of methadone programs-would
enable TA to identify the unqualified applicants on an individual basis. 399 F. Supp., at 1048-1051. On the other
hand, the District Court recognized that at least one-third of
the persons receiving methadone treatment-and probably a
good many more-would unquestionably be classified as
unemployable. 14
After extensively reviewing the evidence, the District Court
briefly stated its conclusion that TA's methadone policy is
unconstitutional. The conclusion rested on the legal proposition that a public entity "cannot bar persons from employment on the basis of criteria which have no rational relation
to the dema11ds of the JOb to be performed." 399 F. Supp.,
at 1057. Because it is clear that substantial numbers of
methadone users are capable of performing many of the jobs
at T A, the court held that the Constitution will not tolerate a
blanket exclusion of all users from all JObs.
The District Court enjoined TA from denying employment
to any person solely because of participation in a methadone
1 • The Dbtrict Court summarized the t~stimony concerning one of the
large::;t ~Uld most ::;uccessful public programs :
"The witnes::;es from the Beth Israel program testified that about onethird of the patients m that program, after a short period of adjustment,
need very little more than the doses of methadone. The prrsons in this
category arr situated fairly sati::;factonly with respect to matters such
as family ties, educatiOn and job~. Another one-third of the patient::; at
Beth I~rael need a moderatr amount of rehabilitation st-rvice, including
vocational as::nstance, for a penod of ::;everal month::; or about a year. A
person m th1s category may, for mstance, have finished high school, but
may havr a long herom h1~tory and no employment record. A final onethird of the patients at Beth Israel need mtens1w ::;upportive service::;, are
performmg m the program marginally, and e1ther will be di::~charged or will
be on the brmk of d.l::;charge" 399 F . Supp., at 1048...

.
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maintenance program. Recognizing, however, the special responsibility for public safety borne by certain T A employees
and the correlation betwee~ longevity in a methadone maintenance program and performance capability, the injunction
authorized TA to exclude methadone users from specific
categories of safety-sensitive positions and also to condition
eligibility on satisfactory performance in a methadone program for at least a year. In other words, the court held that
TA could lawfully adopt general rules excluding all methadone
users from some jobs and a large number of methadone users
from all jobs.
Almost a year later the District Court filed a supplemental
opinion allowing respondents to recover attorneys fees under
42 U. S. C. ~ 2000e-5 (k). This determination was premised
on the court's additional holding that TA's drug policy violated Title VII. Having already concluded that the blanket
exclusion was not rationally related to any business needs of
TA, the court reasoned that the sta.t ute is violated if the
exclusionary policy has a discriminatory effect against blacks
and Hispanics. That effect was proven, in the District Court's
view, by two statistics: ( 1) of the employees referred to T A's
medical consultant for suspected violation of its drug policy,
81% are black or Hispanic; (2) between 62% and 65<fo of all
methadone maintained persons in New York City are black or
Hispanic. 414 F. Supp. 277, 278-279. The Court, however,
did not find that TNs policy was motivated by any bias
against blacks or Hispanics; indeed, it expressly found that
the policy was not adopted with a discriminatory purpose.
ld., at 279.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's constitutional holding. While it declined to reach the statutory
issue, it also affirmed the award of attorneys fees under the
aegis of the recently enacted Civil Rights Attorneys Fee
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. ~ 1988, which provides ade-

.;

,..

. .:
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quate support for an award of legal fees to a party prevailing
on a constitutional claim, 15
After we granted certiorari, Congress amended tlie Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 700 et seq., to prohibit
discrimination against a class of "handicapped' individuals"
that arguably includes certain former drug abusers. and certain
current users of methadone. Pub. L. 95-251, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. Respondents argue that the amendment now mandates
at least the prospective relief gra.n ted by the District Court
and the Court of Appeals and that we should therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. We are satisfied,
however, that we should decide the constitutional question
presented by the petition. Before doing so, we shall discuss
( 1) the effect .of the Rehabilitation Act on this case; and
(2) the error in the District Court's analysis of Title VII.

I
Respondents contend that the recent amendment to § 7 (6)
of the Rehabilitation Act proscribes TA's enforcement of. a
general rule denying employment to methadone users. 16 · Even
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court on one issue relating to relief The lower court had denied rein~:;tatement and back-pay
rehef to two of the four named plaintiffi:i because they admitted having
v10lated TA's unquestiOnably valid rule against taking- heroin while being
in TA's employ. Pet . for Cert., at 77a-78a. The Court of Appeals reversed. It det ermined that the two plaintiffs' former heroin. use and violation of T A's rult'i:i on that account were irrelevant because T A explicitly
premised their firmg exclusively on their use of methadone. 558 F . 2d
97, at 101.
16
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S. C. § 794, provides:
" t.o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
' defined in section 706 (6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the partiCipation 111, be denied the benefits of, or
be subJected to discnminatwn under any program or activity receiving;
Federal financial assistance "
It i~ stipulated that the TA receives federal financial assi~tanc11..
15
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if respondents correctly interpret the amendment, and even
if they have a right to enforce that interpretation, 17 the case
is not moot since their claims arose even before the act itself
was passed/ 8 and they have been awarded monetary relief. 10
Moreover, the language of the statute, even after its amendment, is not free of ambiguity/ 0 and no administrative or
In relevant part,§ 7 (6) of the Act, 29 U.S. C.§ 706 (6), as amended,
provides·
"The term 'handicapped individual' . .. mp,ans any person who (A) has
a phyHical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
of such person's maJOr life activitJes, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) 1s regarded as having such an impairment.
' .. For purposes of 8ections 503 and 504 as such sections relate to
employment, such term does not includr any individual who is an alcoholic
or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drug:; prevents such individual from prrforming the dutws of the job in question or whose employment, by rea:son of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a
direct threat to property or the safety of others."
17 The question whether a cause of action on behalf of handicapped
persons may be implied under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act will be
addressed by th1s Court in Southe(J)Stern Community College v. Davis,
No . 78-711, C'ert. granted Jan. 8, 1979.
18 The latest act of alleged di:scrimination c1ted in respondents' complaint
occurred 111 Apnl 1973, while the Act was passed on September 26, 1973,
Pub. L. 93-112, Title V, and the amendment to § 7 (6) went into effect in
November 6, 1978.
10 Seen. 17, supra.
~ 0 In order for the D1strict Court 's findings to bring the respondent class
conclusively within the Act, we would have to find that denying employment to a methadone user because of that use amounts to excluding an
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . solely by reason of h1s
handicap ." Among other issues, this would require us to determine
(1) whether heroin addicts or current methadone u:ser:; qualify as "handicapped indJvtdual[::;] "-i. e., whether that addiction or use Js (or is
perceived a:s) a " phystcal Impairment winch substanttally limit8 one or
more . . major hfe functions " , (2) whether methadone use prevents the
indivtdual ''from performmg the duties of the job" or "would constitute a
direct threat to property or the safety of others"; aud (3) whether the
members of the respondent cla::;s are "otherwtse qua!ified"-the meaning of
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judicial opinions specifically considering the impact of the
statute on methadone users have been called to our attention.
Of greater importance, it is perfectly clear that however we
might construe the Rehabilitation Act, the concerns that
prompted our grant of certiorari would still merit our attention.21 We therefore decline to give the statute its first judicial construction at this stage of the litigation.

H
Although respondents have consistently relied ori both statutory and constitutional claims, the lower courts focused
primarily on the latter. Thus, when the District Court
decided the Title VII issue, it did so only as an afterthought
in order to support an award of attorneys fees; the Court of
Appeals did not even rea.ch the 'Title VII issue. We do not
condone this departure from settled federal practice. "If
there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in
the process of constitutional adjudica.tion, it is that we ought
not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such
adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Co. v. M cLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105. Before deciding the constitutional question, it was incumbent on those courts to consider
which phrase is at issue in Southeastem Community College v. Davis,
No. 78-711, cert. granted Jan. 8, 1979.
21 See ante, at n. 1 and accompanying text.
Respondents may exaggerate the degree to which the recent amendment altered the law as it
existed when we granted certiorari. Even before the ·Court of Appeals
beard argument in this case, in fact, the Attorney General of the United
States had issued an interpretation of the Act as it then existed which
concludt>d that the Act "doe::; in general prohibit discrimination against
alcoholics and drug addicts in federally-a::;"istt>d programs .... " Opinion
of the Honorable Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of t1w United States
to Honorable Joseph A. Califano, Secretary, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Apnl 12, 1977. Respondent8 brought this Interpretation to our attention beforf' we granted certiorari. Brief in Opposition to
·Certiorari~ at A5- A6,
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whether the statutory grounds might be dispositive. 22 Whatever their reasons for not doing so/a we shall first dispose of
the Title VII issue.24
22 "From Rayburn's Case, 2 Da11. 409, to Alma Mot01· Co. v. Timken~
Detroit Axle Co. and the Hatch Act case dPcided tl1is term, this Court has

followed a policy of strict neces:;ity in dispo::~ing of constitutional isSUf'S .
The earheHt exemplification:;, too well known for repeating the hi:;tory here,
arose in the Court's refusal to render advisory opinions and in appli<'atiol'ls
of the related jurisdictional policy drawn from the case allcl controversy
limitatiOn . U S. Con:>t ., Art. III. . .•
"The poh<'), howf'ver, has not been limited to jurisdictional determination~ . For, in addition, 'the Court [hasJ developed, for it~; own govPrnance in the caHPt:i eonfr::~secll~. within its jurisdiction, a ~;eries of rules under
which Jt has avmded pa:::smg upon a large part of nll the eont'tJtutional
question:; pressed upon 1t for d<'cision .' Thus, as those rule:; wrre listed
in support of the Htatement quoted, constitutio11nl is::~ueH affecting legislatiOn will not be determilwd in friendly, nonadversary proceeding:;; in
advance of the npces::~ity of dPcJding tlwm; in broadPr tC:'rms than are
requirC:'d by th<' preci:se fac1H to which the ruling is to be applied; if the
record presmts some otlwr ground upon wl1icl1 tl1e ca~C:' may be disposed
of ; at the mstance of one who fails to ::~how that hr is injured by the
statute'o operation, or who hn~ avuilrd himsrlf of its benrfit8; or if a ronstructwn of the ~tatute is fairly po::;sible by wi11Ch the que~tion may be
avoided." Re8cue Army v. Municipal Court, :331 U.S. 549, 568--569 (footnot<'~ omJtt<'d), quoting A8htcander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (Brandei:;,
.T, roneurrmg)
23 Respondent:,; Rugge:'it that the lower contt8 properly r<'arhC:'d the eon::;titutJonal issue firHt becau~Se only under the Equal Protrction Clause could
all of the class m<'mbers, mcludmg wh1te methadone users (who presumably do not have standing in this ease nnd<'r Title VII or § 1981)
obtain all of thP rrlief ineluding backpHy, Hought in their complaint. In
addition, thC:'~· point to TA's argument that Title VII and § 1981 arP
uncon~tJtutional inHofar a<> they authorize relirf againHt a ~-;tate subdivision
without any direct allegation or proof of mtr.ntional di~cr1mination. Cf.
Fitzpatnck v. Bitze1·, 427 U. S. 445 : National Leagup of Cities v. Usery,
426 U. S. 83a: Washington Y. DaVIs, 426 P. S. 229; Fry v. United ::itates.
421 U. S. 542, Katzenbaclt ' . ill organ, :~R4 U. S. 641. Under this latter
point, it i~ arguPd that tlw D1~tmt Court quite properly derided to RddreRR

[Footnote (i4 t.s
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The District Court's findings do not support its conclusion
that T A's regulation prohibiting the use of narcotics, or its
interpretation of that regulation to encompass users of methadone, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
A prima fa.cie violation of the A,ct may be established by
·statistical evidence showing that an employment practice ·has
the effect of denying the members of one race equal access to
employment opportunities. Even assuming that respondents
have crossed this threshold. the two statistics on which they
and the District Court ·relied are incapable of proving that
·TA 's rule had a disparate effect on blacks and Hispanics ·in
violation of Title Vli.25
the constitutionality of a municipal agency's hiring practices before
addres::;mg the constitutionality of two Acts of Congress.
Whatever the theoretical validity of respondents' explanations for the
actions of the District Courf and the Court of Appeal~>, the fact remains
that we are forced to speculate about what motivated thf'm becau~>e they
never f'xplained their haste to address a naked constitutional issue despite
· the presencf' in the case of alternative ~>tatutory theories. It al::;o bears
notmg that in it~ second opinion the Di~>trict Court did decide that TA's
policy vwlated a federal statute, and its decision, without addressing any
constitutional issue, provided a statutory basis for virtually all of the relief
that 1t ultimately awarded. Had it confronted the issue, therefore, it
presumably would have concluded that it could have decided the case
without addressmg the constitutional issue on which it initially decided the
case.
24 Although the exact applicability of § 1981 in cases such as this has not
been deCided by this Court, and was not reached by either of the courts
below, it seems clear that it affordi:i no greatt>r substantive protection
than Title VII. Accordingly, our treatment of the Title VII claim also
di:sposf's of the§ 1981 claim without need of a remand.
25 "Statistics are ... competent in proving employment discrimination .
We caution only that statistics are not irrefutable; they come in infinite
variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted . In
short , their usefulness depend;; on all the surrounding facts and circum,;tauee:s." Teamsters v. United States , 431 U. S. 324, 339-340 (footnote
omitted) .
From the tmw thry filed their complaint until their :submissions to this
('ourt, rrspondrnt~ have l't'lied on ::;tati::;tic~; to demonf)trate the di$crimina-

I
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First, the District Court noted that 81% of the employees
referred to TA's medical director for suspected violation of its
narcotics rule were either black or Hispanic. But respondents
have only challenged the rule to the extent that it is construed
to apply to methadone users, and that statistic tells us
nothing about the racial composition of the employees suspected of using methadone. 26 Nor does the record give us
any information about the number of black, Hispanic, or
white persons who were dismissed for using methadone.
Second. the District Court · noted that about 63o/c of the
persons in New York receiving methadone maintenance in
publ-ic programs-i.e., 63o/r, of the 65ro of all New York City
tory effect of TA's methadone policy. They have never attempted to
present a discrimmatory purpose case and would be hard pressed to do so
in the face of the District Court's explicit finding that no wJ, ammus
motivated TA in establi:;hing its policy, 414 F. Supp., at 279, and in the
face of TA 's demonstration in forms filed with the Equal Employmrnt
Opportunity CommissiOn that thr percentage of blacks and Hispanics in
it:> work force i:; well over twice that of the prrcentage in the work force
in the New York metropolitan nrea .
Because of our conclusion on the merits of respondents' Title VII claim.
we need not address the con:;titutwnal challenge made by TA to Title VII
insofar as it authorizes relief agamst a municipal agency under the circumstances of this case. SeP n. 23, supra.
26 Indeed, it is probable that none of the employees comprising this
81% were methadone users. The parties stipulated that:
" T A employees showing phys1c.al manifestations of drug abuse other than
the definite presence of morphine or rnethadone or other illicit drug in the
urine are referred to [the medical director] for consultation . . .." App.,
t 86A (emphasis added)
In view of this stipulation and the District Court'8 finding that few if any
physical manifestations of drug abuse characterize methadone maintained
per8ons, 399 F. Supp., at 1042-1045, it seems likely that such persons
would not be mcluded in the statistical pool referred to by the District
Court . It should also be noted that when the di~sent refer~ to the rejection of almost 5% of all applicants "due to the rule," post. at 3, the reference iH to all narcotic;; users rather than to methadone users. The record
does not tell u~ how many methadone users were rejected.

I
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methadone users who are in such programs 27-are black or
Hispanic. We do not know. however. how many of these persons ever worked or sought to work for TA. This statistic
therefore reveals little if anything about the racial composition of the class of T A job applicants and rmployecs receiving
methadone trE:>atment. Morf' particularly, it tells us nothing
about the class of otherwise-qualified applicants and employees who haw participated in methadone maintenance
programs for over a year-the only class improperly excluded
by TA's policy under the District Court's analysis. The
rf'cord demonstrates. in faet. that the figure is virtually irrelevant bf'cause a substantial portion of the persons included in
it are either unqualified for other reasons-such as the· illicit
use of drugs and alcohol 2 '-or have received successful assistanc<- m finc1mg jobs with employers othrr than TA. 29 Finally,
The ~tnti,.,ti<' rdird npon h~· thr Di:;lriet C'ourt wn~ drriv<·d from a
;;ludy of mrthadone patients prrpared b:v a rc·~rarrher nt Hockefeller Univprsity based upon data snppliPd by thr public mrthadone clinics in New
York. In that the District Court admittrdly rcrrivrd virtually no evid<•nce nbout the privatr chnie~<, thPir funding, and ihrir partiripants, see
aute, at n . 7, there iH no bmHH !'or n:<suming thnt the Hockefeller University
~t1tiistie i8 applirahlc to p:1 rt U'Ipant~ in th<• privntc progmmR.
2 s To dcmon~trate rmplo~·abiht~·, thr Distrirt Court rrferred to a study
inchrating that :34 to 59% of thr methadone u~er~ who have been in a,
maintenance program for n Rubstnntial prriod of time are unemployed.
Thr <'Vldencc WHii inronclusiYc with re:spect to all methadone u;;ers. 39!}
} Snpp., at 1047. Howewr, the director of the ~rcond largest program
in Nrw York C ity testified that onl~r 3~% of the entire methadone patient
populatiOn Ill that program wen• emplo~r ablc. Trial Tran:script, January 10, 1975, at 345. On the ~:;tatb;tic::; relating lo illicit uRe of drugs and
nlcohol, ;;ee ante, at 7.
211 Although "a r;tati~ ticnl ;,;bowing of di><proportionate impact nrrd not
n lway~ br ba~rd on an nnal~·''~"' of tlw rharactrri~ihcs of actual applictmts,"
Dothan! v. Ra1chnsou, 43:3 ll. 1:\. ;~:H, :3:{0, ''rvidenrr ~hawing that th('
figures for t hP gPll<'I'id popula t IOII might not acruratPI~· rdlrct t hr pool of
qu:t hfiect JOb apphraut~ ·· Will rr ndrr the,:r figurr>< u~<'lr~,.; in making out a
prnna fa('l<' easr ' TmmiSter.~ r Umted States, S1tpra, .J:n F. R., at 34{)
27

r
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we have absolutely no data on the 14,000 methadone users
in the private programs, leaving open the possibility that the
percentage of blacks and Hispanics in the class of methadone
users is not significantly greater than the percentage of those
minorities in the general population of New York City.30
At best, respondents' statistical showing is weak; even if it
is capable of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination,
it is assuredly rebutted by T A's demonstration that its narcotics rule (and the rule's application to methadone users) is
"job related." 31 and by the District Court's express finding
that the rule is not a pretext for intentional discrimination.
414 F. Supp .. at 279. We conclude that respondents failed
to prove a violation of Title VII. We therefore must reach _
the constitutional issue.

III
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Clause
3{) If all of the participants in private clinics are white, for example, then
only about 40% of all methadone users would br black or Hispanic-compared to the 36.3% of thr total population of 1\ew York that was black
or Hispanic as of the 1970 census. Assuming instead that the percentage
of those minorities in the private programs duplicatPs their percentage in
the population of New York City, the figurft! would still only show that
50% of all methadone users are black or Hi::;panic compared to 36.3% of
the citywide population.

Respondents recognize, and the findings of the
District Court establish, that TA's legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency require the exclusion
of all users of illegal narcotics, barbituates, and
amphetamines, and of a majority of all methadone users.
See supra, at n. 4; 6 and n.n. 9-10; 8 and n. 14; n. 28.
The D1str1ct Court also held that those goals require the
exclusion of all methadone users from the 25% of its
positions that are 11 Safety sensitive ... See ante, at 9.
Finally, the District Court noted that those goals are
significantly served by--even if they do not require-TA's rule as it applies to all methadone users including
those who are seeking employment in non-safety sensitive
positions.
See infra, at nn. 33, 37.
The record thus
1
11
demonstrates that TA s rule bears a manifest ·relationship
to the employment in question." Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 432.
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
u.s. 405, 425. Whether or not respondents' weak showing
was sufficient to establish a prima facie case, it clearly
failed to carry respondents' ultimate burden of proving
a violation of Title VII.
31
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announcPs a fundamental principle: the Rtate must govern
impartially. General rules that apply evenhandedly to all
persons within the jurisdiction unquestionably comply with
this principle. Only when a governmental unit adopts a rule
that has a special impact on less than all the persons subject
to its jurisdiction does the question whether this principle is
violated arise.
In this case. TA's Rule 11 (b) places a meaningful restriction on all of its employees and job applicants; in that sense
the rule is one of general applicability and satisfies the equal
protection principle without further inquiry. The District
Oourt, however, interpreted the rule as applicable to the
limited class of persons who regularly use narcotic drugs,
including methadone. As so interpreted, we are necessarily
. confronted with the question whether the rule reflects an
impermissible bias against a special class.
Respondents have never questioned the validity of a special
rule for all users of narcotics. Rather, they originally contended that persons receiving methadone should not be
covered by that rule; in other words, they should not be
included within a class that is otherwise unobjectionable.
Their constitutional claim was that methadone users are
entitled to be treated like most other employees and applicants rather than like other users of narcotics. But the
District Court's findings unequivocally establish that there
are relevant differences between persons using methadone
regularly and persons who use no narcotics of any kind. 32
a2 The District Court. found that methadone iR a narcotic. See 399 F.
Supp., at 1038. See abo id., at 1044 ("The evidence is that, during the
t1me patients are being brought up to their constant dosage of methadone
(a prnod of about six weeks), there may be complaints of drowsiness,
insomnia, exce~s ;;weatmg, constipation, and perhaps some other symptoms.''). :\Iorrover, every member of the cla:>s of methadone users was
formerly addicted to the usc of heroin . None is completely cured; otherwise, there wuuld he no contmuing nred for treatment. All require some
measure of :.pcc1al supervision, and all muRt structure their weeKly
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Respondents no longer question the need. or at least the
justification, for special rules for methadone users. Indeed,
they vigorously defend the District Court's opinion which
expressly held that it woulclbe permissible for TA to have a
·special rule denying methadone users any employment unless
they had been undergoing treatment for at least a year, and
another special rule denying even the most senior and reliable
methadone users any of the more dangerous jobs in the
'System.
The constitutional defect in TA's employment policies,
according to the District Court, is not that· TA ·has special
rules for methadone users. but rather that some members of
the class should have been exempted from souve requirements
of the special rules. Left intact by its holding are rules
requiring special supervision of methadone users to detect
evidence of drug abuse. ana excluding them from high-risk
employment. Acceptin·g those rules, the District Court nonetheless concluded that employment in nonsensitive jobs could
not be denied to methadone users who had progressed satisfactorily with their treatment for one year. and who. when
examined individually, satisfied TA's employment criteria.
In short, having recognized that disparate treatment of methadone users simply because they are methadone users is
'routines around mandatory appearance~ at mrthadone clinics. The clinics
make periodic checks as long as the treatment continues in order to detect
evidence of drug abuse. Employers must rf>vif>w, ai1d sometimes verify,
these checks; since the record indicate;: that the information supplied by
trratment centers i~ not. uniformally reliable, see n. 7, supm. the employer
has a special and continuing re:>ponsibility to review the condition of these
persons.
In addition, a sub~tantial pf>rcentage of per~onR taking methadone will
not succe;;sfully complete the treatment program. The findings do not
indicate with any prcciHiou the number who drop out, or the number who
can fairly be classified aR unemployable, but t lw Pviclence indica teJS that it
may wf>ll be a majority of tho::;e taking methadone ut uny given time. See

l'#?nnd
zq

,,~P>U.

77-1427-0PINION
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. BEAZER

20

permissible-and having excused TA from an acro~s-the-board
requirement of individual con~jderation of such persons--the
District Court construed , the Equal Protection Clause . as
more-- precise special
requiring T A to -adopt additional
rules for that special class.
But any special rule short of total exchisio11 that ·TA might
adopt is likely to be less precise-and will assuredly be more
costly ~ -than the one that it currently enforces. If eligibil-

and

8

The District Court identified several significant screening procedures
that TA would have to adopt specially for methadone users if it abandoned its rule. For example, the court notf'd that current methadone users
(but no other applicants) would have to:
"demonstrate that they have been on a reliaLle methadone program for
a year or more; that they have faithfully abided b~ · the rules of the program; [and] that, according to ,;y~;tematic tests and observatiqns, they
havo been free of any illicit drug or alcohol abu:se for the entire period
of treatment excluding a possibJ,e <idjustmt•nt period . . . . " 399 F . Supp.,
at 1049.
The District Court also recognized that verifying the above demonstrations by the methadpllfi user would require Hpecial efforts to obtain
reliable information from, and about, each of the many different methadone maintenance clinics-a task that it recognized · could be problematic
in some cases. a99 F. Supp., at 1050, see ante, at n . 7. Furthermore,
once it hired a methadone u:ser, TA would have a continuing d11ty to
monitor his progre~;s in the maintenance program and would have to take
spec1al precautions against his promotion to any of the safety-sen~;itive
positions from which the District Court held he may be excluded.
33

The dissent is therefore repeatedly mistaken in attributing to the District Court a finding that TA's "normal :screening process without additional effort" would suffice in the ab~:~ence of the "no drug8~' rule. /d., at
9 n. 10. See id., at 5, 9. Aggravating this erroneous factual assumption
.b a mistaken legal propo:sition advancrd by the dissent-that TA can be
faulted for failing to prove the unemployability of "successfully maintained methadonr u:>ers." I d., at 6-7. A::;ide from the misallocation of
the burden of proof that underlies this argument, it is important to note,
see id., at 7, that TA did prove that 20 to 30% of the cia ·s afforded relief
by the District Court are not "successfully maintained/' and hence are
aRsuredly not employable. Even as::;uming therefore that the percentage
of employable persons ·in the remaining 70% is 1he _tsame as that in the

.:
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· ity is marked at any intermediate point-whether after one
year of treatment or la.ter-the classification will inevitably
discriminate between employees or applicants equally or
almost equally apt to achieve full recovery. 34 Even the District Court's opinion did not rigidly specify one year as a constitutionally mandated measure of the period of treatment
that guarantees full recovery from drug addiction.a" The
uncertainties associated with the rehabilitation of heroin
addicts precluded it from identifying any bright line marking
the point at which the risk of regression ends. 311 By contrast,
the "no drugs" policy now enforced by T A is supported by
the legitimate inference that as long as a treatment program
(or other drug use) continues, a degree of uncertainty persists.37 Accordingly, an employment policy that postpones

cla~>s of TA applicants who do not use methadone, it is respondents who~
must be faulted for failing to prove that the offending 30% could be
excluded a!:i cheaply and effectivrly in the ab~ence of the rule.
:H It may well be, in fact , that many methadone usrrs who have been in
programs for something less than a year are actually more qualified for
employment than many others who have been in a program for longer
than a year.
3 " "The TA is not prevented from making reasonable rules and regulations about methadon~ maintained persons-such as requiring satisfactory
performance in a program for a period of time such as a year . . .."
399 F. Supp., at 1058.
30 These uncertainties are evident not only in the District Court's findings but also in legislatiYe consideration of the problem. See Marshall v.
United States, 414 U. S. 417, ·125-427.
ar The completion of the program alHo marks the point at which the
employee or applicant considers himself cured of drug dependence. Moreover, it is the point at which the employee/ applicant no longer must make
regular visits to a methadone clinic, no longrr has access to free methadone that might be hoarded and taken m rxrr~sive and physically disruptive doses, and at which a simple urme test-as opposed to a urine test
followed up by efforts to verify the bona fides of the subject's participation in a methadone program, and of the program itself-suffices to prove
compliance with T A's rules.
Respondents argue that the validity of these considerations is belied by
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eligibility until the treatment program has been completed,
rather than accepting an intermediate point on an uncertain
line, is rational. It is neither unprincipled nor invidious in
the sense that it implies disrespect for the excluded subclass.
At its simplest, the District ~Court's conclusion was that
TA's rule is broader than necessary to exclude those methadone users who are not actuaJly qualified to work for··TA.
We may assume not only that this conclusion is correct but also
that it is probably unwise for a la.rge employer like TA to rely
on a general rule instead of individualized consideration of
every job applicant. But these assumptions concern matteFS
of personnel policy that do not implicate the principle safeguarded by the Equal Protection Clause.~ 8 As the District
Court recognized, the special classification created by TA's
rule serves the general objectives of safety and efficiency.~~
TA's treatment of alcoholics. Although TA refuses to hire new employees
with drinking problems, it continues in its employ a large number <'>f
persons who have either been found ·drinking on the job or have been
doomed unfit for duty because of prior drinking. 111ese situations give
ris6 to discipline but are handled on an individual· basi:>. But the fltct
· that T A has the resources to expend on one class of problem employees
does not by itself establish a constitutional · duty on its part to come up
with resources to spend on all classes of problem employees.
aR The District Court also concluded that TA's rule violates the Due
Proces::; Clause because it creates an "irrebutable presumption" of unemployability on th!' part of methadone users. :399 F: Supp., at 1057. Respondents do not rely on the due process argum!'nt: in this Court, and
we find no merit in it.
31' "[L]egislativ!' classification;.; ·are valid unl!'R::; they b!'ar no rational·
relationship to the State's objectives. M 01!Sachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, [427 U.S. 307, 314]. State legislation 'does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely becaus!' the classifications [it makes] are imperfect.' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485." W01!hington v.
Yakima Indian Nation, U. S. - , (slip op., at 38). See alsQo
Vance v. Bradley, U. S. - , - , quoting Phillips Chemical Co. v.
Dumas School District, 361 U. S. 376, 385. ("Even if the classification
involved here is to some !'Xtent both under- and overinclusiv!', and hence
the line drawn by Congres::; imperfect, it i;; neverthelt>s::; the rule that h,1 ,a1
· fl_as(l like this 'verfection is by no m!'ans required.' ~·) ..
·
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Moreover, the exclusionary line challenged by respondents "is
not one which is directed 'against' any individual or category
of persons, but rather it represents a policy choice . . . made
by that branch of Government vested with the power to make
such choices." Marshall v. 'United States, 414' U.S. 417, 428.
Because it does not circumscribe a class of persons characterized by some unpopular trait or affiliation, it does not create
or reflect any special likelihood of bias on the part of the
ruling majority.40 Under these circumstances, it is of no
constitutional significance that the degree of rationality is not
a.s great with respect to certain ill-defined stibpa.rts of the
classification as it is with respect to the classification as a.
whole. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 83-84.41
40 Since Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, the Courf:s equal protection
cases have recognized a distinction between "invidious discrimination/ 1
id., at 31-i. e., classifications drawn 1'with an evil eye and an unequaJ
hand" or motivated by "a feeling ot antipathy 1' against, a specific group \
of residents, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373-374; Soon Hing v.
Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710; see also Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S.
59; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398-and those special rules that "are
often necessary for general benefit;; [such us] supplying water, preventing
fires, lightir>g streets, opening parks, and many other objects.' 1 Barbier.
supra, 113 U.S., at 31. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239241. Quite plainly, TA's Rule 11 (b) was motivated by TA's interest in
operating a safe and efficient transportation system rather than by any
special animus again;;t a specific group of per:sons. Cf. 4l4 F. Supp., at
279. Respondents recognize this valid general motivation, as did the District Court, and for that reason neither challenges TA's rule as it applies
to all narcotic users, or even to all methadone users. Because respondents
merely challenge the rule insofar as it applie:; to some methadone users,
that challenge does not even raise the question whether the rule falls on
the ·'invidiout>" side of the Barbier di;;tinction. Accordingly, there i:s nothing to give rise to a presumption of illegality and to warrant our especially
"att entive judgm<:'nt." Cf. 'l'ruax v. Corrigan, 257 LT. S. 312, 327.
4 1 ·'Whrn a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts there may
be, between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a point has to be fixed or a line has to be drnwn, or gradually
picked out by successive decision:;, to mark where thr change takes place.
Looked at by itself wW10ut regard to the necessity behind it the llne Pf
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No matter how unwise it may be for TA to refuse employment to indi,vidual 'ca.r cleaners, track repairmen, or bus
drivers simply. because. they are receiving methadone treatment, the Constitution does not authorize aFedera1 Court -to
interfere in that policy decision. ·' The judgment Of the Court
of ,Appeals .is
· Rever8ed.

point .::eems arbitrary, It might as welT or nearly as well be a little more
to one side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or point there
must be, and that there is no mathematiral or logical way of fixing it preri'sely, tt1e decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say
that it is very widP of any reasonable mark." Louisrille Ga.~ CO!. \!. Col(}IJWI.'I,,
u. S. :32, 41 (HolnleS, .r ., dissenting-).

zn
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Mr~

Justice Powell, concurring and dissenting.

To the extent the Court determines the validity of the
Transit Authority's rule barring present methadone users from
employment, I concur in its judgment that the rule, so limited,
does not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

cannot agree, however, that the Transit Authority's rule is
limited in the manner described.

The record and the opinions

of the courts below make clear that the Transit Authority also
will not employ persons who are currently free of methadone use
but who used the drug within at least the previous five years.
To the extent the Transit Authority refuses to consider for
employment persons currently free of methadone addiction, I
believe

~~

i ~ violates

the Equal Protection Clause.

The Second Circuit understood that the Transit
Authority's rule constituted a "blanket exclusion from
employment of all persons participating in or having

2.

successfully completed methadone maintenance programs."
F.2d 97, 99 (1977).

558

The District Court was unsure as to

whether all past users were excluded, but did indicate that the
policy extended at least to persons who had been free of
methadone use tor less than five years.
1036 (1975).

In light of petitioners'

399 F. Supp. 1032,
~

1 admission

of the

fact, Brief for Petitioners 5, the conclusion seems inescapable
that the Transit Authority's policy barred employment of at
least those users who had undergone methadone treatment within
1

the preceding five years.

J' 4-~ = ~

.-\ rfhe

/AcA., ~~ ~~
~ ~ Auefl.eriey's policy~ not impermissibly

interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right or operate
2

to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.

Accordingly,

to constitute a denial of equal protection it must fail to
satisfy the rational-basis standard of scrutiny our decisions
have applied.

See Vance v. Bradley,

Massachusetts
(1976);

Bd~

u.s.

(1979);

of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314

San Antonio

Ind~ · Schoo!, · Dist~

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
But this

(1973);

"
"

inquiry, althugh relaxed, is not empty.
determine

~hether

We still must

the challenged distinction rationally

furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose."

roJ·~~J...-

v. Royster, 410

~~-;w-

fYV'·

-•~

I

u.s.

uJ

/1-~ ~~' ~- ...vtY

~IP-~~~v

I
263, 270 (1973) ;_J

3.

Applying the rational-basis standard to the facts
found by the District Court, it must be concluded that the
categorical exclusion from employment of all persons who have
used methadone in the preceding five years, but who currently
are free of drug use, does not satisfy the requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause.

The Court appears to imply as much,

as it observes that "an employment policy that postpones
eligibility until the treatment program has been completed,
rather than accepting an intermediate point on an uncertain
line, is rational."

~,at

22.

See id., at n. 37.

In

contrast, a policy that postpones eligibility until five years
after treatment has ended, as does petitioners', can be
regarded on this record only as a means of punishing past
methadone users.

Because employability, and not punishment, is

the articulated purpose of the Transit Authority's distinction,
I would hold that petitioners have violated the Constitution to
the extent they have refused to hire past methadone users who
currently are free of drug use.

PBS-3/2/79

n. 3.

Frasier, one of the named plainti

-

this class

action, had recently terminated methadone use at
applied for a job as a bus cleaner.

The District Cour

as a fact that Frasier "was rejected because of his former
methadone use," 399 F. Supp. 1032,

TJ,.,.-.

··

(SDNY 1975), and the

~ ~~ flll;ttt/.L~W ~

Court of Appeals did not reject this finding. A Unlike the
Court, ante, at 7 n. 12, I would neither overturn

~

~

factual

determination by two lower courts nor attempt sua sponte to
reassess Frasier's fitness
users.

t. y-~t.~
~ ~ -!::!~~ .... «-_}
represent~ class of former

In light of the Transit Authority's conceded policy of

not employing former as well as present methadone users,

vT-

~ tr..~.,~~-·~ ~
sid R ~ Reed to engage in the futile ritual of

AFrasier

reapplying for employment at periodic intervals in order to
have standing to assert for purposes of equitable relief the
rights of those who had been free of drug use for longer
periods.
2.

For the reasons stated by the Court in Part II of

its opinion, I do not believe respondents established a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even

FN 2.

when the full scope of the Transit Authority's policy is taken
into account.

lfp/ss
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77-1427 N.Y. City Transit v. Beazer
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
The opinion of the Court addresses, and
sustains, the policy of the Transit Authority under its
Rule ll(b) only insofar as it is applied to employees
and

applicants for employment who "are receiving

methadone treatments" (emphasis supplied).
n.3, and 24.

Ante, at 3,

I concur in the opinion of the Court

holding that there is no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause or Title VII when the Authority's
policy is applied to employees or applicants who are
currently on methadone .M I

~Two

of the respondents are former employees of TA who
were dismissed while on methadone treatment. The other
two were refused employment, one while he was taking
methadone and the other after the ~onclusion
of his methadone treatment. See ante, at 6,7 ~

2.

But in my view the case presented by the
record and opinions of the Courts below is not limited
to the effect of the rule on present methadone users.

CAV\~

Indeed, I have thought it ~ecoinize~by all concerned
that the Transit Authority's policy of exclusion

c.-- ~r~J.
~~ended

to persons currently free of methadone use

~

who had been on the drug within the previous five
years. The District Court was unsure as to whether all
past users were excluded but indicated that the policy
~~xcXtis±on

extended at least to persons who had been

free of methadone use for less than five years.

399 F.

1-

Sup. 1032, 1036 (1975).

The Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit was unequivocal.
rule

as-a~p-l±ed-

It understood that the

constituted a "blanket exclusion from

employment of all persons participating in or having
successfully completed methadone maintenance programs"

':--

558 F.2d 97, 99 (1977).
Petitioner~ brief in this Court states,

in

effect, that the Authority will only consider
applicants for employment who have been free of a druq
B,~s- ·.
problem for "at least five years", (19o- 5):

"[T]he Authority will give individual
consideration to people with a past history of
drug addiction including those who have

3.
completed either a drug free or a methadone
maintenance program, and who have been
completely druq free and have had a stable
hi story for at least five years. ·' ( R. tr.
1/2 8/7 5, pp. 7 0 9 , 714 , 715 ) •>I '3 V\1 <1.~ ~ (~C:t~ S ,
There was a similar recognition of the Authority's
policy in the petition for a writ of certiorari.}

~In the P~titione~ Statement of the Case the affected
class was said to include former addicts "who are
participants in or have completed a methadone
maintenance program".
Petition vaot 4 (emphasis
supplied).
~ ~~
The brief for respondents similarly described
the Transit Authority's policy:
"The Transit Authority's blanket denial of
employment to fully rehabilitated heroin
addicts who are being or ever have been
treated in methadone maintance programs
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Respondenttt s -srt-e:f 59.

4.

Despite this unanimity among the parties and
courts below as to the case presented, the Court today
simply chooses to consider and decide the validity of
the Authority's policy with respect to employees and
applicants currently receiving methadone treatment.
The explanation given for thus limitinq its decision is
that "neither the findings of fact nor the record
evidence squarely presents any issue with respect to
former users that must be resolved in order to dispose
k

of this litigation".
-tk lu.;.~

Ante at 2-;r- 3, n. 3.
~~)

--...

VU-<'.J )

.~-\- ~* ~ ~ ~ ~ ) ~ ~"- c..<MMAh~ 5 ~ )....(..._-t:;l-.<..""

~-e~~-ee-R-trary
W)

..l->71W. ~~ --\\. ~

This reading

as;; I have

nat e d

.aoo-v-e----

~~JA.,'

~fte--pereepH-Gn-s-O-f-tbe

parties and the. -eon r t s

)fThe Court's incomplete reference to the opinion and
findings of the District Court, ante at 3, n. 3, omits
entirely the finding of that court:
"Plaintiff Beazer is such a person [one who
had successfully withdrawn from methadone],
having ceased using methadone almost two years
ago • • • • There is no rational reason for
maintaining an absolute bar against the
employment of these persons regardless of
their individual merit." Pet. for Cert., App.
5la.
1· The District Court also noted that the Authority
"contends that it cannot afford to take what it
considers the risks of employing present or past
methadone maintained persons, except possibily those
who have been successfully withdrawn from methadone for
several years." Pet., App. 54a. (emphasis supplied).

5.

I conclude that the Court has decided only a
portion of the case presented, and has failed to
address what it recognizes as the more difficult issue.
~ J..'2. ,. " ."'>1
~'

at 2~,

n. 3,

We owe it to the parties to resolve

all issues properly presented, rather than afford no
guidance whatever as to whether former drug and
methadone users may be excluded from employment by the
Authority.

I agree with the courts below that there is

no rational basis for an absolute bar against the
employment of persons who have completed successfully a
methadone maintenance program and who otherwise are
qualified for employment.

I think the exclusion of all

such persons is an irrational and discriminatory
classification, and one that does not further a
legitimate state interest.

(Cite authorities).

I

therefore would affirm the judgment below with respect
to the class of persons represented by respondent
Beazer.
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77-1427 N.Y. City Trarysit v. Beazer
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
The opinion of the Court addresses, and
sustains, the policy of the Transit Authority under its
Rule ll(b) only insofar as it is applied to employees
and

applicants for employment who "are receiving

methadone treatments" (emphasis supplied).
n.3, and 24.

Ante, at 3,

I concur in the opinion of the Court

holding that there is no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause or Title VII when the Authority's
policy is applied to employees or applicants who are
currently on methadone.*

*Two of . the respondents are former employees of TA who
were dismissed while on methadone treatment. The other
two were refused employment, one while he was taking
methadone and the other after the successful conclusion
of his methadone treatment. See ante, at 6,7.

2.

But in my view the case presented by the
record and opinions of the Courts below is not limited
to the effect of the rule on present methadone users.
Indeed, I have thought it recognized by all concerned
that the Transit Authority's policy of exclusion
extended to persons currently free of methadone use but
who had been on the drug within the previous five
years. The District Court was unsure as to whether all
past users were excluded but indicated that the policy
of exclusion extended at least to persons who had been
free of methadone use for less than five years.
Sup. 1032, 1036 (1975).

399 F.

The Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit was unequivocal.

It understood that the

rule as applied constituted a "blanket exclusion from
employment of all persons participating in or having
successfully completed methadone maintenance programs"
558 F.2d 97, 99 (1977).
Petitioner's brief in this Court states, in
effect, that the Authority will only consider
applicants for employment who have been free of a druq
problem for "at least five years"

(p. 5):

"[T]he Authority will give individual
consideration to people with a past history of
drug addiction including those who have

3.
completed either a drug free or a
maintenance program, and who have
completely drug free and have had
history for at least five years.
1 /2 8 /7 5 ' pp • 7 0 9 ' 714 ' 715 ) •

methadone
been
a stable
(R. tr.

There was a similar recognition of the Authority's
policy in the petition for a writ of certiorari.*

*In the Petitioner's Statement of the Case the affected
class was said to include former addicts "who are
participants in or have ~ comp!eted a methadone
maintenance program".
Petition at 4 (emphasis
supplied).
The brief for respondents similarly described
the Transit Authority's policy:
"The Transit Authority's blanket denial of
employment to fully rehabilitated heroin
addicts who are being or ever have been
treated in methadone maintance programs
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Respondent's Brief 59.

4.

Despite this unanimity among the parties and
courts below as to the case presented, the Court today
simply chooses to consider and decide the validity of
the Authority's policy with respect to employees and
applicants currently receiving methadone treatment.
The explanation given for thus limiting its decision is
that "neither the findings of fact nor the record
evidence squarely presents any issue with respect to
former users that must be resolved in order to dispose
of this litigation".

Ante at 2, 3, n. 3.

This reading

of the record is quite contrary - as I have noted above to the perceptions of the parties and the courts
below.*

*The Court's incomplete reference to the opinion and
findings of the District Court, ante at 3, n. 3, omits
entirely the finding of that court:
"Plaintiff Beazer is such a person [one who
had successfully withdrawn from methadone],
having ceased using methadone almost two years
ago • • • • There is no rational reason for
maintaining an absolute bar against the
employment of these persons regardless of
their individual merit." Pet. for Cert., App.
Sla.
The District Court also noted that the Authority
"contends that it cannot afford to take what it
considers the risks of employing present ~r. Rast
methadone maintained persons, except possibily those
who have been successfully withdrawn from methadone for
several years." Pet., App. 54a. (emphasis supplied).

5.

I conclude that the Court has decided only a
portion of the case presented, and has failed to
address what it recognizes as the more difficult issue.
Ante, at 3, n. 3.

We owe it to the parties to resolve

all issues properly presented, rather than afford no
guidance whatever as to whether former drug and
methadone users may be excluded from employment by the
Authority.

I agree with the courts below that there is

no rational basis for an absolute bar against the
employment of persons who have completed successfully a
methadone maintenance program and who otherwise are
qualified for employment.

I think the exclusion of all

such persons is an irrational and discriminatory
classification, and one that does not further a
legitimate state interest.

(Cite authorities).

I

therefore would affirm the judgment below with respect
to the class of persons represented by respondent
Beazer.

lfp/ss
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
The opinion of the Court addresses, and
sustains, the policy of the Transit Authority under its
Rule ll(b) only insofar as it is applied to employees
and

applicants for employment who "are · receiving

methadone treatments" (emphasis supplied).
n.3, and 24.

Ante, at 3,

I concur in the opinion of the Court

holding that there is no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause or Title VII when the Authority's
policy is applied to employees or applicants who are
currently on methadone.*

*Two of the respondents are former employees of TA who
were dismissed while on methadone treatment. The other
two were refused employment, one while he was taking
methadone and the other after the successful conclusion
of his methadone treatment. See~' at 6,7.

2.

But in my view the case presented by the
record and opinions of the Courts below is not limited
to the effect of the rule on present methadone users.
Indeed, I have thought it recognized by all concerned
that the Transit Authority's policy of exclusion
extended to persons currently free of methadone use but
who had been on the drug within the previous five
years. The District Court was unsure as to whether all
past users were excluded but indicated that the policy
of exclusion extended at least to persons who had been
free of methadone use for less than five years.
Sup. 1032, 1036 (1975).

399 F.

The Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit was unequivocal.

It understood that the

rule as applied constituted a "blanket exclusion from
employment of all persons participating in or having
successfully completed methadone maintenance programs"
558 F.2d 97, 99 (1977).
~

__::.

-

Th±S-vleW of the Authority's policy was

l: nfirmed here in the brief filed on behalf of
I

~~

'
"[T]he Authority will give individual
consideration to people with a past history of
drug addiction including those who have
completed either a drug free or a methadone
maintenance program, and who have been
completely drug free and have had a stable

3.
history for at least five years.
1/28/75, pp. 709, 714, 715).

(R. tr.

There was a similar recognition of the Authority's
policy in the petition for a writ of certiorari.*

*In the-Petitioner's Statement of the Case the affected
class was said to include former addicts "who are
participants in or have cqmplet~d a methadone
maintenance program". Petition at 4 (emphasis
supplied).
The brief for respondents similarly described
the Transit Authority's policy:
"The Transit Authority's blanket denial of
employment to fully rehabilitated heroin ·
addicts who are being or ever have been
treated in methadone maintance programs
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Respondent's Brief 59.

4.

Despite this unanimity among the parties and
courts below as to the case presented, the Court today
simply chooses to consider and decide the validity of

~~

the Authority's policy with respect to applicants
I\

currently receiving methadone treatment.

The

explanation given for thus limiting its decision is
that "neither the findings of fact nor the record
evidence squarely presents any issue with respect to
former users that must be resolved in order to dispose
of this litigation".

Ante at 2, 3, n. 3.

This readinq

of the record is quite contrary - as I have noted above to the perceptions of the parties and the courts
below.*

*The Courtrs incomplete reference to the opinion and
findings of the District Court, ante at 3, n. 3, omits
entirely the finding of that court:
"Plaintiff Beazer is such a person [one who
had successfully withdrawn from methadone],
having ceased using methadone almost two years
ago • • • • There is no rational reason for
maintaining an absolute bar against the
employment of these persons regardless of
their individual merit." Pet. for Cert., App.
Sla.
The District Court also noted that the Authority
"contends that it cannot afford to take what it
considers the risks of employing present or 2ast
methadone maintained persons, except possibily those
who have been successfully withdrawn from methadone for
several years." Pet., App. 54a. (emphasis supplied).

5.

I conclude that the Court has decided only a
portion of the case presented, and has failed to
address what it recognizes as the more difficult issue.
~'

at 3, n. 3.

We owe it to the parties to resolve

all issues properly presented, rather than afford no

~~

guidance whatever as to whether former methadone users

'\

may be excluded

f~om

employment by the Authority.

I

agree with the courts below that there is no rational
basis for an absolute bar against the employment of
persons who have completed successfully a methadone
maintenance program and who otherwise are qualified for
~

employment.

I think the exclusion of such persons is
1\

an irrational and discriminatory classification, and
one that does not further a legitimate state interest.
(Cite authorities).

~~~

I therefore would affirm Awith

respect to the class of persons represented by
respondent Beazer.
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New York City Transit Authority) On \Vrit of Certiorari to
et al.. Petitioners,
the l:"nited States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Carl A. Beazer et al

I March - , 1979 I
MH. Juti'rrcE PowELJ.,, concurnng in part and. dissenting in
part.
The opinion of the Court addresses. and sustains, the policy
of the Transit Authority under its Rule 11 (b) only insofar
as it applies to employees and applicants for employment
who "are receiving methado11e treatments" (emphasis supplied). Ante, at 3 n. 3. and 24. I concur ill the opinion of
thr Court holding that there is no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause or Title VII when the Authority's policy
is applied to employe<'s or applica11ts who are currently on
methadone.
But i11 my view the question presented by the record and
opinions of the courts below is not limited to thP effect of the
rule on present methadone users. Indeed, 1 have thought it
conceded by all concemed that the Transit Authority's policy
of exclusiou extended bryond the literal language of Rule
11 (b) to persons currPntly fre(' of lllethadone use but who
had beeu on the drug within the prt>vious five years. The
D1strict Court vvas unsllrc' wlwther all past users were excluded
but indicated that the policy of exclusion covered at least
twrsons who had been free of methadone use for less than five
vears. 3D~l F ~upp 1032, 1036 (1975) .' The Court of
Di~tnct

al~o

uotrd that th(• Authority "contends that it
c·on~Jc!Pr~ thr riHk~ of rmployiug p1"eseut Ol'
pu81 mrt ha<loll(' ma 1n t mned wr~ons, exrrpt poH~ihl y t ho::;r who have been
1

Tlw

Co11rt

c·nnJJOt atl"ord to takr what It

'·
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Appeals for the Second Circuit was unequivocal. It understood that the rule constituted a "blanket exclusion from
employment of all persons participating in or having successfully completed methadone maintenance programs.'' 558 F.
2d 97, 99 (1977) .
Petitioners' brief in this Court states, in effect, that the
Authority will consider only applicants for employment who
have been free of a drug problem for "at least five years" :
" rT]he Authority will give individual consideration to
people with a past history of drug addiction including
those who have completed either a drug free or a methadone maintenance program, and who have been completely drug free and have had a stable history for at least
five years. (R. tr. l / 28/75, pp. 709, 714, 715)." Brief
for Petitioners 5.
There was a similar recognition of the Authority's policy in
the petition for a writ of certiorari.~
Despite this unanimity among th~ parties and courts below
as to the question presented, the Court today simply chooses
to limit its decision to the policy with respect to employees
and applicants currently receiving methadone treatment. The
explanation given is that "neither the findings of fact nor the
record evidencC' squarely presents any issue with respect to
former users that must be resolved in order to dispose of this
::;uccrssfuJJ:v withdrawn from mrthadonP for ~Pveral year;;. " agg F . Snpp.
1032, 1052 (SDNY 1975) trmpha::n~ ::;upplird) .
2 In peiitioner~ ' Statrment of the Ca::;r thr affrctrd class was said to
include former add1ctH "who ru·r part1eipani::; in or have completed a
methadon(' maintrnanrP program ." PP1. for Crrt. 4 (empha:;J::; HUpplied) .
Thr bm'f for rr~pondrnt s Hlmilarly clPHrribcd thr Tran~Jt . Authority's·
pohc~' ·
''The Tramnt Authont~,·~ blanket dE>nHd of employmPnt to fully rPhab1li-·
tatc•d herolll addirts who an• bemg or pver haw bc•eu trcatrd in methadon<> maintenn nr<> program~ vwlate~ t lw Equal Protect 1011 and Dur Proces~·
Cl m,tse~ of lhP ~'ourternth Ammcllncnt " Brief fur He~pouclent ~.
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litigation." Ante, at 2--3. n. 3. In light of the findings and
decision of the courts below, and petitioners' concessions, this
limitation seems unj ustifiable.'l
I conclude that the· Court has dPcided only a portion of the
case presentf'd, and has failed to address what it recognizes as
the more difficult issur. A nle, at 2-3. n. 3. 22, and n. 37. We
owe it to the parties to resolve all issues properly presented,
rather than to afford no guidance whatever as to whether
former drug and methadonf' users may be excluded from
employuwnt by the Authority. I agree with the courts below
that there is no rational basis for an absolute bar against the
emploympnt of persons who have completed successfully a
rnethadonf' maintenance program and who otherwise are
qualified for employment. See Vance v. Bradley, U. S.
- , - (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
'' The Court :>erw~ to imp]~· that Lrcausc the Transit Autborit~·'s policy
with respE'ct to formrr mrthadmw ttHE'r~ had not bc<·n invoked again~! any
of the named plailltitl's, it wa~ 1mproper for the District Comt to crrtify
a rlaHs of former u~C'I'~ who would be affected by the polic~·. Ante. at 2-3,
n. a, 7 ll. 12. Putt in~~: a~JdP whet her it i~ proper for thi~ Comt to disregard the Di;otrlf'l Court'~ explicit finding that plaintiff Frasier "was
rejrcted Ll'rau~e of hi~ fon/11:''1' m<'lhaclon<· use," :399 F . Supp., at 1034
(('mpha::;i::; :mpplird), the Court owrlook the finding that :
f>.
''[I Jt 1s unquestwned that dtt•re are many methadone maintenance patients
who ~ucrE'~,full~· withdraw from methadonC' and :stay clear of drug abuse
therE'after. PlamtJfl' Bt>uzcr i~ Huch a. per~un, having ceased using metl1adonc almo~t two years ago. . . There is no rational reason for maintaining an absolutP bar agnin~t thr emplo~·ment of these prr ·ons regardless
of their mdiYidual mrrit ." !d., at 1051.
H i~ ciPar that BPazPr both wa::< a prop<'r reprPsmtative of tlw class of
former u~er:-; and wa::; mtPrC'St<'d m Tran~1! Authurit~· Pmployment, inasmuch as rC'msta temt'nt wa,.; part of thl' rrlief lw sought. In light of thE'
Tramll Authonty'" unrtpnvoral policy of not Pmploying persons in
BPazer·~ po~ition , tt wn~ llll!H'<'e~~ary for him to <•ngage ill the futile ritual
of rrappl~ · mg for emplo~·mrtn aftt•r tPrmmating his mC'thadone usc in
order to lwve "tanding to <t(taek tiH· polwy.

1
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Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 40 (1973).. I therefore would affirm
the judgment below with respect to the class of persons wh~
are former methadone users:

'l'o :

~JJ

·rte Chief Justice
Mr. Just i.e~ Brennan
Mr . Justice Ste~art
Mr. Just; ·~n Wnita
Mr. Ju~ t: ' ;L•-.r·aha.ll
Mr. Jus t1 r: ., :;1a.okmun
Mr. Just i.,u R:•hnq'tl1 St
Mr. Justice StGvens

From: Kr. Justice Powell
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAmJ
No. 77- 1427
New York City Transit AuthoritylOn '\Vrit of CPrtioral'i to
Pt al., Petitio11ers,
thf' F nitRd StatE's Court
v.
of Appeals for the Sec·
Carl A. Beazer et al.
ond Circuit.
rMarch - , 19791

MR.

JtrSTICE

PowELL, concurri11g in part and dissenting in

part.
Thr opinion of tlw Court addrPSSE'S, and sustains, the policy
of the Transit Authority undrr its Rule 11 (b) only ·insofar
as it applit>s to rmployees and applicants for Pmployment
who "are receiving m ethadon e treatments" (emphasis suppliPd) . Ante, at :3 n. 3. a11d 24. I concur in the opinion of
the• Court holding that tlwre .is no violation of the Equal
ProtPction Clause or Title VII when thP Authority's policy
is applied to employ<'PS or applicants who arc currPntly on
methadone.
But in my viPw the qupstion J)ff'Sentf'd by the record and
opinions of the courts bPlow is not limited to thf' eft'ect of the
rule on present methadonE' users. Indeed. I havP thought it
conceded by all coneC'med that the· Transit Authority's policy
of exclusion extPndE'd beyond the literal languagE' of Rule
11 (b) to persons curTf'ntly frf'E' of lllethadone use but who
had bE>en on tlw drug; within the previous five years. Tlw
District Court 'A 'as unsure whE'thcr all past users were excluded
but indicated that the policy of exclusion cow•red at least
p<•rsons who had been frre of methadone use for less than five
y<•ars. 3m) F :-iupp. 1032, 1036 (H)75).' The Court of
I 1'Jw Di;;tnct Comt al;;o notPCI that tlu' Authonty " contend~ that 1t
l'annot [lfford to takP what 1! consider~ the ri s k~ of employing present or
pas~ metha<lonc ma\ntnmecl pen;oJIS , c•xrPpt JXlH;;ibl ' tho~r who have been
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Appeals for the Second Circuit was unequivocal. It understood that the rule constituted a "blanket exclusion from
employment of all persons participating in or having successfully completed methadone maintenance programs." 558 F.
2d 97. 99 (1977).
Petitioners' brief in this Court states, in effect, that the
Authority will consider only applicants for employment who
have been free of a drug problem for "at least five years":
"[T]he Authority will give individual consideration to
people with a past history of drug addiction including
those who have completed either a drug free or a methadone maintenance program. and who have been completely drug free and have had a stable history for at least
five years. Brief for Petitioners 5.
There was a similar recognition of the Authority's policy in
the petition for a writ of certiorari.~
Despite this unanimity among the parties and courts below
as to the question presented. the Court today simply chooses
to limit its decision to the policy with respect to employees
and applicants currently receiving methadone treatment. The
explanatiou given is that "neither the fiJl(lings of fact nor the
record evidence squarely presents any issue with respect to
former users that must be resolved in order to dispose of this
litigatiou ." Ante, at 2-3, 11. 3. But tlw only support thE' \
,'ucccssfully w1thdmwn from mPthadonr for sevrral year:;." 399 F . Supp.
1032, 1052 (SDNY 1975) (empha:;is :;upplied).
2
l11 pPtitionPr~' Statrment of the Ca~r the affrctcd rla~s was said to
include former addic·t~'< '· who arc participants in or have completed a
methadone mamtenanc:c prop;ram." Pet. for Cert. 4 (empha:;i:; ~upplied).
The brief for n•:;pondcnto: ~imilarly cle:-;cribed the Tran:;Jt Authority',;
polic·~·.

'' The Tran:;it Authont~··s blanket denwl of employment to full~· rehubililatc·d heroin ncldicts who arP h~?ing or Pver have bPI?JJ treated in methadone maintenance programs violate:>~ lhl' Equal Protection and Due Pmces~
Clnu~e:; of the Foml<'rnth Auwndmenl." Brief for He:;pondents.
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f4ourt ri L<'s for th i~ sta tc•tn<'n t is a lark of proof as Lo the
policy's ad llR 1 appl iea t ion. f n light of th<• <'XJH'('i:iR adm is~ ion
of tlw Tranr-:it .\uthority to tlw l)istriet Court that th<' poli('y
extended to at l0ast som0 fornwr LIS('rs." <'vidPilC<' of tlw past
application of the• poliey was irrel<'vant to the fashioning of
pros p0et i vf' n· 1ief. 1
I conclude that th0 rourt has d0cided only a portion of the
case presented. and has failed to address what it recognizes as
the morr difficult issue. A 11le, at 2- 3. 11. 3. 22, and n. 37. We
O\H' it to the parties to n•solve all issues properly presE:>n tt>cl.
rathN tha11 to afford no guidancr what<•vf'r as to "·lwtlwr
former drug and methadonP usrrs may be excluded from
employment by the Authority. I agree with tlw courts oelow
that ther<' is no ratio1Ial basis for an absolut(' bar against the
e>mploynwnt of p('rsons who haVC' eompll•ted successfully a

I

Com! of .\ppt•al~ .\pp. uona- lll2a.
,;(•t·m,, 1o irnpJ_,. thai IH•c·:tn,.t· the Tran,.il Authorit.1·',. polit•)'
with r<'~ppr·l to forrn<•r· nwtlwdont• u,;c•r,; had not l1<·en invoked a~rnins1 <IllY
of thf' nnmPd plnintiffs , it wa,; illl]li'OJlN for the Distriel Court to <'et1ify
:1 elas,: of former tt,.rr" who would be alfc·c·t('(l by the' polic)·. Aute. Ht 2-:3,
11 . :~, i 11. 1:2 .
En•n if otlt ' wt·n• to <"OII~idl'r 11 pro]Wr for thi~ Court to
tli,.n•g:ml th<· Di,;ITwi ( 'ourf ·.~ r·xplieil finding that plain tift' Fra,cit'r .. wa"
rrjectPd !wean~<· of hi,.- fonnel' mdhad01w nst•,'' :{99 F . ~upp. , at 10B4
(<•mpha:<i~ "upplied) , tlw ( 'oml uvprlook" the• fmtlwr finding that :
'·I Ill i,.; tllltf\l<'~fionrd that then• an• man)· nwfhadom· maintPnance pa1iPnt~:~
who ~nrct '""full~ · withdraw from methadone :mel ,.;1a)· <"iPar of dmg abuse
lhNf'<tflc·r. l'lamtitr Hr azt•r i~ "ueh a p<'r,.on, having <'PHSPcl u"ing mP.thadonr almost two )"Par,; ago . . . . Tht•rr i:,; no rational n·a,.;:on for maintaiuing- an nh~ ohtt<' bar a~rain"l 1hP Pmploym<'nt of thPsE' JlN~on~ regardless
of thPir individual mrril." !d., at 1051.
lt i:< elc'ar that Heazc•r both was a proper rPpn•,.rntafive of 1hP ela:o..- of
form r r ns<·r,; and wa" llllt•rPRf Pel in Tn1n~1t Ant l10rit )" <'lii]Jio)·mpnt , ina~
mueh a" rpin,.faiPnWttt "'"" part of tiH' reliPf hr "ought. Ttl light of thC'
TntnHit. Ani honl _, .·~ tllll'qnivoeal polic·)· of not c·mplo)·ing ppr,;on~ in
BPazer':< po"ition , 1! wa~ umwc·Pi-<~ar) · for him to l'ngagt' itl t hP f11tilr rituaT
of rrappl)·ing for c•mplo)·IIH'IIt aftc•r fNminating his mPthaclone use J.lb
Qrder to han• :-:t<tiHling to aftac·k. tht• poltey.
3 ' ('(', 1'. (! .• :3
1 Tht' ( 'our!
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mrthadonP main tPnaHce program and who othNwise are
qualified for E'mploynwnt. Srr lla11ce v. Bradley, F. H.
- , - (1979l; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. 1\!Iuryia,
427 1 . R. 307. 314 (197o); &v11 Anto-nio Ind. &·hoot Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411
1. 40 (H.J73). I thereforE' would affirm
the .iu<lguwnt below with respect to the cla:o:s of persons who
are former methadone US{'rs.

r. :-;.

tqt ~lnittb ~mftrl'
';JlllUlfrht!lton. ;IJ. QJ. 211,GJ!)

.§lt.prtntt QJourt of
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March 13, 1979

Re:

77-1427 - N.Y. City Transit Authority v. Beazer

Dear John:
I

join.

Regards,

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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